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In the period from 1991 to 1995, three major humanitarian crises took place; in 
the former Yugoslavia, in Somalia, and in Rwanda hundreds of thousands of 
people were killed.  This period coincides with the end of the Soviet Union and 
the consequent advent of American hegemony.  This paper explores why the 
United States did not intervene in these crises, or did not do so until the crisis was 
well advanced.  It examines the domestic, personal, and international constraints 
and considerations acting on U.S. policymakers that led to their adopting specific 
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 This paper examines United States foreign policy during the early 1990s in terms 
of three case studies: the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia, Somalia, 
and Rwanda.  The central question of this paper is why, in light of the end of the Cold 
War and the United States’ consequent hegemony, paired with the outbreak of these three 
crises, did the United States under either President Bush or Preseident Clinton not adopt a 
foreign policy more willing to take an active role in ending these conflicts?  I examine 
this question by analyzing the attitudes and actions of those decision makers, from the 
President down through the bureaucracy, who influenced policy during this time, and the 
forces, both domestic and international, which affected their actions. 
 It is important today to understand why the United States did not act during the 
crises in the early 1990s, because the international system has changed little since then; 
the United States is still able to exercise its power to stop conflicts that create 
humanitarian crises.  Better understanding how the United States acted in the past when 
confronted with humanitarian crises will both help predict future patterns and aid those 
who wish to push for a more activist policy.  In addition, these crises help to reveal how 
the United States responds to conflicts that are not of immediate import. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 marked the transition to 
a new era in the international system.  No longer were two superpowers almost constantly 
at odds, complicating to the point of near impossibility any attempt to intervene in 
humanitarian crises.  Despite the memory of the Holocaust, regimes such as the Khmer 
Rouge in Cambodia were allowed to kill millions of their own people.  The Cold War 
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was the unquestioned priority for the United States, and tragic as it may have been, the 
Khmer Rouge’s genocide did not threaten to upset the balance of power, and was 
consequently unimportant.  But even had the United States been willing to act in such 
situations, there was a constant threat that the Soviet Union might counter an American 
intervention, leading to yet another regional war, or even another World War. 
 Therefore, interventions during the Cold War took place mostly in states where 
the United States saw a threat to its national interest, or there was minimal threat of 
Soviet retaliation.  For the reasons explained above, policymakers did not consider 
humanitarian crises in general – even genocide – as worthy of the risks that accompanied 
intervention.  The end of the Cold War brought with it an opportunity to change the 
paradigm through which foreign policy is viewed.  With the United States the sole 
remaining superpower, and Europe not yet united under the European Union, there was 
an opportunity to make good on the promise of “never again” that presidents have issued 
repeatedly since the Holocaust. 
 That did not happen, however.  President Bush was unwilling to change his and 
his administration’s view of the duties and interests of the United States in relation to the 
rest of the world.  Even after the breakup of the Soviet Union, he was unwilling to take 
the lead in ending the wars in Croatia and Bosnia.1  The result was a rejection of precisely 
the kind of humanitarian intervention that the end of the Cold War made possible.  
President Bush’s actions in Somalia, while on the surface appear to be precisely the kind 
 
1 Throughout this paper, the former Yugoslav territories are referred to as both Bosnia and Yugoslavia.  
This is because the crisis as discussed here involves three states: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia.  
When discussing events affecting two or more of the states, Yugoslavia is used.  However, from 1992 until 
the summer of 1995, most of the events discussed occurred in Bosnia, so that state is referred to frequently 
in isolation from the others. 
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of intervention it rejected in Bosnia, were never an attempt to resolve the crisis; rather, 
they attempted only to alleviate the immediate suffering in response to domestic political 
concerns and to restrict Clinton’s freedom of action once he took office.  Despite his 
claims to the contrary, Bush’s actions during 1991 in both the former Yugoslavia and 
Somalia were clearly influenced by election year politics. 
 President Clinton’s handling of the Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda crises rebuked 
any hope for a foreign policy that took humanitarian crises seriously.  As a liberal and the 
first post-Cold War president, Clinton could have brought a fundamentally different 
perspective to American foreign policy.  However, Clinton’s disinterest in foreign policy 
and unwillingness to sacrifice domestic priorities for causes which the public was at best 
marginally concerned with, led his administration away from intervention. 
 This pattern is especially apparent in Bosnia, where Clinton’s initial policy choice 
– which was based on humanitarian principles – was deemed too difficult, and 
unceremoniously abandoned.  Thereafter the United States distanced itself from the 
conflict, until it was no longer politically advantageous to do so.  When Bosnia finally 
appeared to be jeopardizing Clinton’s other priorities, an interventionist policy was 
quickly drafted and put into practice.  Neither Somalia nor Rwanda could have had 
anything but a negative effect on Clinton’s political position, and so his administration 
effectively ignored both conflicts.  In Somalia, the Clinton administration made the 
decision to withdraw the troops as quickly as possible immediately after the disastrous 
firefight in Mogadishu, when public opinion turned so sharply against the operation.  
Intervention in Rwanda was never really a consideration, given the humiliation in 
4 
Somalia the previous year and the utter unimportance of the country in the international 
system. 
 The three conflicts examined in this paper – Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda – are 
indicative of the United States’ treatment of difficult humanitarian crises during the 
1990s.  Though the United States did intervene elsewhere during this period – most 
notably Haiti and Kosovo – those conflicts were less controversial for the Clinton 
administration than intervention in the other three would have been.  The United States’ 
actions in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda reflected the post-Cold War political realities in 
foreign policy more than did Haiti and Kosovo.  The intervention in Haiti was relatively 
unsurprising, given its proximity to the United States; which both placed it within the 
U.S.’s natural sphere of influence and created the threat of a massive refugee exodus.  
Kosovo, by nature of its geographic location and the Albanian population’s persecution 
by the Serbs, presented a situation similar to that in Bosnia.  Given that similarity, it 
would have been politically difficult for the United States to stay out of Kosovo, and even 
more so had it destabilized other states in the region, as it nearly did Macedonia.   
 By contrast, none of the three crises examined in this paper presented a reason to 
intervene, at least initially, not based on humanitarian concerns.  Bosnia was only a 
national interest concern if the conflict there spilled over to Kosovo and threatened to 
destabilize the region, Somalia lost its strategic significance even before the end of the 
Cold War, and Rwanda was never much of a concern.  Each of these case studies 
represents a point that could have signaled a definitive change in policy, but for various 
reasons did not.  During the early 1990s, without concerns about national interests, 
5 
intervention in these places should only be considered in terms of humanitarian or 
political considerations.  Both the Bush and Clinton administrations showed some 
concern for humanitarian principles, but were at best reluctant to deal with the political 





 Yugoslavia was an artificial creation held together by its charismatic dictator, 
Tito, a former communist partisan; it was comprised of the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro.  Bosnia was the most 
ethnically integrated of the republics, with a Muslim plurality and sizable minority Serb 
and Croat populations.  It declared independence in March 1992 in response to Serbian 
President Slobodan Milosevic’s increasingly nationalist policies.  Croatia and Slovenia 
had declared their independence the previous summer, which led the Croatian Serb 
population, with the support of Milosevic, to secede and set up its own mini-state in large 
areas of northeastern Croatia. 
 Yugoslav National Army (JNA) forces and Bosnian Serbs quickly attacked 
Bosnia’s Muslim and Croat populations, and gained control of about seventy percent of 
the country by August 1992.  That same month, journalists discovered Serb-run 
concentration camps in Bosnia.  The Bush Administration protested, but did little.  Bill 
Clinton, then a presidential candidate, criticized President Bush for not taking a more 
forceful stand. 
 Srebrenica, which the UN declared a “safe area” in April 1993, fell to the Serbs in 
July 1995.  The Serbs massacred thousands of Muslim men.  Despite international 
outrage, and sporadic NATO bombings, neither Europe nor the United States exerted 
serious pressure on the Serbs.  Not until August 1995, in response to Serbian shelling in 
Sarajevo, did NATO finally began intensive bombing, which together with economic 
sanctions, military defeats at the hands of the Bosnians and Croats, and general war 
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weariness, forced Milosevic to negotiate a peace treaty.  In December, Milosevic, the 




The Bush Administration 
 
 
The Bush administration’s policies on Yugoslavia evolved through two distinct 
phases: supporting “unity and democracy,” or holding the country together, as long as it 
was governed democratically; and letting the European Community take the lead on 
policy after the conflict started in June 1991.  The “unity and democracy” policy was the 
United States’ initial position, and was only abandoned when war broke out in mid 1991.  
After that point, the Bush administration tried to stay out of the conflict, and refused even 
to participate in peace negotiations.  Consistent throughout both of these policy phases 
was a refusal to even consider the use of military force, driven by both the Pentagon’s 
and the administration’s views of the conflict and its effect on the national interest.   
  
Ending the Cold War: “Unity and Democracy” 
  
As the first battles in Slovenia and Croatia were fought in the summer of 1991, 
the Cold War was drawing to a close.  Human rights activists hoped that the world’s 
attention would turn to humanitarian crises, instead of being fixated, as it had for the 
previous forty-plus years, on crises strictly defined by national security, political and 
 
2 Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo, (New York: Random House, 1998), xl-xlix; 
Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 
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economic interests.  Those hopes were quickly dashed by the Bush administration’s lack 
of interest in stopping the conflict in Yugoslavia.  Further complicating the situation, the 
easing of Cold War tensions and the subsequent reduction of Yugoslavia’s strategic 
importance – and the foreign aid that came along with it – helped the rise of nationalist 
parties in each of the Yugoslav republics.3   
 President Bush’s top foreign policy priority after the Persian Gulf War was to 
bring the Cold War peacefully to an end.  Until the Soviet Union’s dissolution at the end 
of 1991, U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans was at best secondary to relations with the 
Soviet Union.  Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, recalled that 
his instructions upon being appointed in 1989 were to tell the Yugoslav government that 
they were no longer important; more forward-looking former Warsaw Pact states, such as 
Poland and Hungary, were now the United States’ priorities in Eastern Europe.4  The 
administration’s attention, so much as the White House and the State Department had 
limited resources for dealing with major crises, was dedicated to the Soviet Union, which 
clearly raised national interest concerns.  There was simply little time or desire in the 
White House or among senior State Department officials to address the complicated and 
difficult issues in Yugoslavia.5
 So much as the Bush administration did spend time on Yugoslavia; its goal was 
minimizing the impact of events there upon the Soviet Union.  David Halberstam 
observed that U.S. foreign policy during 1991 was “Gorbo-centric,” because “what was 
 
3 Warren Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs 
74, no. 1 (1995): 2-3. 
4 Ibid, 2-3. 
5 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 26. 
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good for Mikhail Gorbachev and American-Soviet relations” was important, not what 
was good for the emerging republics in Yugoslavia.6  Of central importance to Gorbachev 
was holding together the Soviet Republics.  The Bush administration recognized the 
parallels between the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the potential disintegration of the 
Soviet Union.  Secretary of State James Baker observed in the fall of 1991 that if the 
Soviet Union were to break up, the situation would resemble “Yugoslavia with nukes.”7  
Baker feared a situation where the federal Soviet government would use force to keep the 
country united, as the Yugoslav National Army was doing in Croatia.  At the time, 
several of the republics within the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons stationed on their 
soil.  The Bush administration was clearly worried about the fate of these weapons and 
their potential use if a conflict started between the republics. 
 Because of the parallels between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the Bush 
administration could not support the dissolution of one state while opposing it in the 
other.  If the United States recognized Slovenia and Croatia, which had declared 
independence in June 1991, it would have to do the same for any Soviet Republics which 
wished to secede.  Concerned with bringing the Cold War to a final, peaceful end, Bush 
and his administration were openly hostile to the unilateral dissolution of Yugoslavia.8
 President Bush and his foreign policy advisors also feared that a breakup of the 
Soviet Union would imperil Gorbachev’s hold on power and lead to the rise of a 
 
6 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (New York: Touchstone, 
2002), 34, 32. 
7 Richard Johnson, “Serbia and Russia: U.S. Appeasement and the Resurrection of Fascism,” The Conceit 
of Innocence: Losing the Conscience of the West in the War Against Bosnia, ed. Stjepan G. Mestrovic 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), 186. 
8 Andrei Edemskii, “Russian Perspectives,” International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Crisis, eds. Alex 
Danchev and Thomas Halverson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 31. 
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government from the reactionary right.9  The possibility of a coup by the far right was an 
event the Bush administration wished to avoid at all costs, as it could have reignited the 
Cold War.  Gorbachev was also very aware of the effect the breakup of Yugoslavia might 
have on his state.  He recognized that what happened in Yugoslavia, where forces loyal to 
the individual republics fought the federal Army, might happen in the Soviet Union.10  
The Soviet Republics were exhibiting separatist tendencies, and Gorbachev needed to 
keep them together.  Bush understood this, and formulated his policy accordingly.11  
President Bush’s obligingly “Gorbo-centric” policy on Yugoslavia helped keep the Soviet 
Union together and Gorbachev in power throughout the summer of 1991.   
 The attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the final dissolution of the 
Soviet Union at the end of December 1991 spelled the end of the Soviets’ automatic 
hostility to the Yugoslav Republics’ independence.  As the Soviet Union peacefully 
disintegrated, it removed the necessity for the United States’ policy.12  However, the 
United States did not immediately reevaluate its policy and recognize Croatia and 
Slovenia.  Though Russia itself recognized the two new states in February 1992, the 
United States did not follow suit until April.  Russia, after gaining its independence, did 
not take an active role in the Yugoslav conflict for several years, as it turned inward to 
deal with domestic issues and resolve disputes with the other former Soviet Republics.  
The United States, had it chosen to intervene in early 1992, was at the height of its 
 
9 Halberstam, 33. 
10James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), 186. 
11 Edemskii, 30. 
12 Gow, 187; Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 177. 
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potential influence in the region, because “there was not even a theoretical possibility of 
converting the conflict into a clash between Communist East and democratic West” as 
there had been for so long during the Cold War.13
 The Bush administration’s initial policy on Yugoslavia was known as “unity and 
democracy.”14  It supported the unity of Yugoslavia - even as it became increasingly 
evident it would not survive - to support Gorbachev’s position in Moscow.  However, 
Bush could not completely abandon the ideals of democratic self-determination.  So 
when Secretary of State Baker visited Belgrade on a one-day stop in June 1991, he 
warned the Yugoslav leaders that “If you force the United States to choose between unity 
and democracy we will always choose democracy.”15  The groundwork for this policy 
had been laid in January of 1991, when Zimmermann told the Yugoslav leaders that the 
United States would not recognize the legitimacy of the use of force to hold the country 
together.16  However, as Ambassador Zimmermann observed, “the United States had 
given no consideration to using force to stop a Serbian/JNA attack on Slovenia or 
Croatia.”17  Baker restated that the U.S. would not accept the use of force to hold the 
country together during his visit, while at the same time warning Tudjman and Kucan, the 
leaders of Croatia and Slovenia respectively, not to declare independence unilaterally.18   
Without the threat of force to back up his policies, Baker had almost no influence on the 
Yugoslav leaders.  When Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally declared independence on 
 
13 Edemskii, 32. 
14 Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam: Constraining the 
Colossus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 179. 
15 Zimmermann, 12. 
16 Susan L. Woodward, “International Aspects of the Wars in Former Yugoslavia: 1990-1996,”  Burn This 
House, eds. Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 221. 
17 Zimmermann, 11-12. 
18 Ibid, 11. 
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June 25, 1991, the United States did not recognize either state, and pushed its allies, 
especially in the European Community, to refrain also.19
 Germany, however, newly reunited and testing its political clout, pushed for 
recognition of the new states.  To Germany, the “victory of the principle of self-
determination of peoples as an act of democratic will” was more important than the 
United States’ concerns about the Soviet Union’s breakup.20  The “principle of self-
determination of peoples” was the catalyst for German reunification, and was an idea 
German foreign policy planners ardently believed in; having used it to justify their 
reunification, they could not ignore the wishes of the people in Slovenia and Croatia for 
independence. 
The rest of the European Community did not support recognition, but their 
options were limited.  During the summer of 1991, the Treaty of Maastricht, which 
formed the European Union, was being finalized.  In addition to a monetary union, one of 
its pillars was a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  If Germany forced 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, while the rest of the EC refused, Maastricht would 
be a dead letter.21  When Germany did recognize the two new states in December of 
1991, the rest of the EC was forced to choose between two bad options: the abandonment 
of the principle that Yugoslavia should remain a single state and a split within the EC just 
 
19 Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order (New 
York: Cassell, 1999), 216; James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-
1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 639. 
20 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 153. 
21 Holbrooke, 31. 
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as it was supposed to be coming together.  In the end, the EC chose to recognize Croatia 
and Slovenia, which it did unanimously on January 15 1992.22
The United States was not pleased with the EC’s decision, because it made the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia inevitable.23  Recognition by the leading Western European 
states meant Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence would be permanent, and ended any 
hopes for a united Yugoslavia.  The United States officially recognized Slovenia and 
Croatia on April 7, 1992.  It recognized Bosnia, which had declared its independence on 
March 3, at the same time.24  The Bush administration hoped recognition would keep the 
Serbs from committing further acts of aggression, especially in Bosnia, where war was 
about to start.  The United States knew after the conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia that 
“Bosnia’s ethnic diversity and the Muslim plurality’s defenselessness would make the 
next war the deadliest of all.”25  However, the Serbs ignored the message Washington 
sent by recognizing Bosnia, and began their assault the next day.26  The Serbs knew the 
recognition of Bosnian independence was “a formal act bereft of the practical 
consequences that would ensure independence and territorial integrity.”27  The United 
States and the EC were simply not prepared to defend the new state from aggression. 
President Bush’s Yugoslav policies aided in the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War, but they came at the expense of the people of 
Yugoslavia, especially the Croats and Bosnian Muslims.  For Bush’s foreign policy team, 
 
22 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 188. 
23 Hurst, 216. 
24 Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower: United States’ Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1997), 143. 
25 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Perennial, 
2003), 252. 
26 Silber and Little, 222. 
27 Joseph Joffe, “The New Europe: Yesterday’s Ghosts,”  Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1 (1996): 3; Power, 249. 
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the national interest question was paramount, and events in Yugoslavia were just not 
important enough to force a realignment of foreign policy goals.  After the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the U.S. still clung to its “unity and democracy” policy, trying to preserve 
the fiction of Yugoslavia as a single state.  When the Bush administration finally reversed 
its policy, it did so without a commitment to guaranteeing the new states’ integrity.  The 
lack of a clear commitment to stop the conflict emboldened the Serbs, and they embarked 
on the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia. 
 
“We Don’t Have a Dog in this Fight” 
  
After the Persian Gulf War, human rights activists hoped the Bush administration 
had ushered in a new era of respect for human rights, one where the imperilment of “vital 
American interests or cherished values” would be sufficient cause for intervention in 
humanitarian crises.28  However, the Bush administration refuted that hope, or at least the 
idea that “cherished values” included humanitarian missions, when Secretary of State 
Baker declared, “[The United States] cannot and should not be expected to be, the 
world’s policeman.”29  Despite the end of the Cold War, and the gradual but steady gains 
human rights had made in the international community’s consciousness since World War 
II, the Bush administration was not prepared to take on purely humanitarian causes, 
especially if they appeared to entail significant political or military risks. 
 
28 Power, 260-1. 
29 Baker, 651. 
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 Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s national security advisor, acknowledged that 
the administration was “heavily national interest oriented.”30  Though he personally 
believed there was a need for a more aggressive policy, Scowcroft was “wary of being 
pulled into so ancient a struggle,” particularly one without any other advocates within the 
administration pushing for intervention.31  Scowcroft had served as an Air Force attaché 
in Belgrade, and so was familiar with the country.  He met daily with President Bush, and 
the two men even wrote a memoir together after leaving office, so Scowcroft’s potential 
influence on Bush cannot be discounted, had he chosen to exercise it.   
President Bush was known as a foreign policy president, and was firmly grounded 
in the realist national interest school, to which the rest of the senior administration 
officials also subscribed.32  Scowcroft summed up the administration’s attitude on Bosnia 
in terms of the interests involved: 
We could never satisfy ourselves that the amount of involvement it would take was 
justified in terms of U.S. interests involved.33
 
Bosnia in and of itself was just not a threat to what the Bush administration perceived of 
as the United States’ interests.  Only a widening of the war could prompt U.S. action.  
Continued Scowcroft,  
Bosnia was of national interest concern only if war broke out in Kosovo, risking the 
involvement of our allies [Greece and Turkey] in a wider war.  If it stayed constrained in 
Bosnia, it might have been horrible, but it did not affect us.34
 
Scowcroft also acknowledged that preventing genocide was in the United States’ interest, 
but ethnic cleansing – which was how the State Department chose to refer to Serb 
 
30 Power, 288. 
31 Halberstam, 43. 
32 Hurst, 10. 
33 Power, 288. 
34 Ibid, 288. 
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treatment of Bosnian civilians – was not.  Further, stopping genocide was not an interest 
of the United States for any intrinsic moral reason, but “because the United States needs 
to appear to be upholding international law.”35  At the time, whether or not Serb actions 
in Bosnia constituted genocide was debatable, but the State Department and 
administration steadfastly resisted attempts by the press corps to describe atrocities in 
Bosnia as genocide without modifiers such as ‘acts of genocide’ or ‘tantamount to 
genocide’ which were used throughout both the Bush and Clinton administrations.36
 Intervening in a conflict as complex as the one unfolding in Yugoslavia that did 
not involve any clear interests of the United States was decidedly not part of Bush’s 
foreign policy philosophy.  Bush, according to Scowcroft, never really understood the 
conflict there; the names, places and rivalries were all new and more complicated than he 
was prepared to deal with.  Every time Scowcroft would brief the president, Bush would 
instruct him to “tell me again what this is all about.”37  In describing why the United 
States refused to take a more active role in Yugoslavia, Bush characterized the situation 
as “a complex, convoluted conflict that grows out of age-old animosities and centuries-
old feuds.”38  He believed this despite the opinion of those who watched the region and 
 
35 Ibid, 288.  The United States is a signatory to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, which according to some interpretations requires action to prevent or stop genocide 
from occurring. 
36 Richard Johnson, “The Pinstripe Approach to Genocide,” The Conceit of Innocence: Losing the 
Conscience of the West in the War against Bosnia, ed. Stjepan G. Mestrovic (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1997), 66. 
 66.  The Hague Court prosecuting war crimes in Bosnia ruled in April 2004 that genocide had taken place 
in Bosnia.  See Marlise Simons, “World Briefing Europe: The Hague: Court Affirms Genocide in Bosnia,” 
The New York Times, April 20, 2004, sec. A. 
37 Halberstam, 44. 
38 Power, 282. 
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the conflict closely, that it was really a grab for power – which exploited, but was not 
driven by, those “age-old animosities.”39
 Baker took his cue on the importance of Yugoslav policy directly from the 
President. He “had no great philosophical vision of foreign policy” which he might have 
used to influenced the administration’s policy on intervention.40  Baker was content to 
follow Bush’s lead and not to question the President’s overarching foreign policy 
philosophy, especially on an issue with little priority within the administration.  Like 
Bush, Baker’s personality did not lend itself to solving the complicated and intertwined 
problems of Yugoslavia.  As David Halberstam noted:  
[Baker] was not fond of difficult, dangerous places, filled with bitterly aggrieved people 
who presented political and human questions that, if not exactly insoluble, were as close 
as you could get.41
 
Reflecting both his “penchant for winnable contests” and the lack of importance he 
assigned Yugoslavia, Baker placed Lawrence Eagleburger, an Assistant Secretary of 
State, in charge of Yugoslav policy.42  Eagleburger was a natural choice to head up policy 
on Yugoslavia, because he served as ambassador there in the 1970s.  However, Baker’s 
delegation of responsibility still revealed the lack of importance the Bush administration 
assigned the conflict; he would have placed himself in charge if it were a critical 
question. 
 Eagleburger, the State Department’s most senior expert on Yugoslavia, had a very 
fatalistic attitude about the conflicts erupting there.  He was appalled by the violence, 
 
39 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 92. 
40 Halberstam, 65. 
41 Ibid, 44-5. 
42 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 155. 
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especially the killing of civilians, in a country he by all accounts was very fond of.43  In a 
sense, he wrote off Yugoslavia:  
It is difficult to explain, but this war is not rational.  There is no rationality at all about 
ethnic conflict.  It is gut, it is hatred; it’s not for any common set of values or purposes; it 
just goes on.  And that kind of warfare is most difficult to bring to a halt.44
 
Eagleburger might have known better about the origins of the conflict.  Having spent 
several years in Yugoslavia, he must have known that the different ethnic groups were 
not constantly in conflict; most of the time they lived in peace, and even had a relatively 
high rate of intermarriage, especially in Bosnia.  It appeared that he had developed what 
Susan Woodward described as “a New World fatalism about Old World nationalism” 
which influenced his thinking on the conflict.45
 Another influence on Eagleburger’s attitude towards the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia was the fact that he had spent most of his time in Belgrade, the capital of both 
Yugoslavia and the Serbian Republic.  He, along with most of the other State Department 
officials, was more familiar with Belgrade, and the Serbian people and leaders, than with 
Zagreb and the Croatians or Sarajevo and the Bosnians.46  During his time in Belgrade, 
Eagleburger developed a social relationship with Milosevic, and had maintained ties to 
government officials in the 1980s when he served as president of Yugo America, the 
American division of the Yugoslav car manufacturer.47  These relationships, as well as a 
general nostalgia for Tito’s Yugoslavia, help explain his reluctance to push for 
intervention during the early stages of the conflict.   
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 Eagleburger took a trip to Yugoslavia to visit Milosevic in February 1991 to warn 
him against using violence if the country broke apart.  Upon returning, Eagleburger was 
convinced that “It is going to be bloody as hell.”  However, he also believed that 
Yugoslavia was now Europe’s problem, and that there was no solution which would 
succeed; indeed, even getting involved in Yugoslavia, Eagleburger thought, would harm 
the United States.48  As the United States’ top official in charge of Yugoslav policy, 
Eagleburger at least initially viewed the situation as hopeless, which fit perfectly with the 
President’s desire to stay out of conflicts which did not directly affect the country’s 
interests.  With higher officials all disinterested in or equally fatalistic about the Yugoslav 
conflict there was no vocal high-level support for an interventionist policy. 
 Though no high-level officials were pushing for intervention, lower level officials 
in the State Department, particularly at the country-desk level, were actively pushing for 
a more activist policy.  These officials dealt with the conflict on a daily basis, and knew 
more about what was happening there than anyone else.  So Eagleburger was at a kind of 
fulcrum in policy; he was being pushed from below to take a more active role, while 
those above were unwilling to consider a change in policy.49
 James Baker resigned as Secretary of State in order to become a political advisor 
to Bush in the last months of his 1992 reelection campaign.  Eagleburger was promoted 
to Acting Secretary of State, where he had, at least theoretically, more ability to influence 
policy on Yugoslavia than he had before.  The prediction Eagleburger made in early 1991 
about the war being “bloody as hell” turned out to be truer than he expected.  After the 
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war spread to Bosnia in April 1992, he realized that it turned out to be even worse than he 
had initially anticipated.  To some extent, he had expected a traditional conflict, fought 
between armies, not the campaigns against civilians which marked the majority of the 
fighting in Bosnia.50  As it became more and more clear what was happening in Bosnia, 
Eagleburger became uncomfortable with State Department policy, but didn’t see any 
alternatives.  After President Bush lost the 1992 election, Eagleburger at least talked 
about the situation in Bosnia more honestly:  
We have, on the one hand, a moral and historical obligation not to stand back a second 
time in this century while a people faces obliteration.  But we have also, I believe, a 
political obligation to the people of Serbia to signal clearly the risk they currently run of 
sharing the inevitable fate of those who practice ethnic cleansing in their names.51
 
Eagleburger, in talking of the “inevitable risk” the people of Serbia were taking, was not 
referring to military action, but rather to a United Nations tribunal, which was eventually 
set up and has prosecuted many of the people indicted on war crimes charges. 
 Eagleburger was encouraged to make even this relatively timid statement – he 
was, after all, at this point working for a lame-duck administration – by several junior 
State Department officials, such as Jim Hooper, Richard Johnson, Bill Montgomery, Jon 
Western and John Fox.52  Elie Wiesel, the prominent Holocaust survivor and advocate of 
an interventionist Bosnian policy, also met with Eagleburger and encouraged him to take 
a harder line on the Serbs.53  What the lower level State Department officials really hoped 
to push Eagleburger to do was acknowledge that Serb atrocities in Bosnia amounted to 
genocide.  They believed doing so would force some sort of more forceful action from 
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the United States and the international community, or at the very least make the political 
figures believe there would be some sort of price to pay in terms of world and public 
opinion if the conflict were allowed to continue.54   
At least privately, Eagleburger eventually came to agree with them.  However, he 
could not make a public statement to that effect, because he believed, according to 
Samantha Power, “that it would be unfair for the Bush administration to issue a finding of 
genocide just as the next administration was taking over.”55  The Bush administration’s 
caution and desire to stay away from the Yugoslav conflicts extended right to the end, 
when a finding of genocide, no matter how “unfair,” might have forced action by the 
incoming Clinton administration.   
The Bush administration actually did acknowledge that genocide was being 
committed in Bosnia, however tangentially.  In December of 1992, the U.S. supported a 
United Nations resolution which described Serb atrocities in Bosnia as “genocide.”  The 
State Department, however, did not consider this resolution to be official policy, and it 
had no effect upon the administration’s policies.56  After the election, Eagleburger went 
so far as to become the first vocal advocate in government of a “lift and strike” policy: 
lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims so they could defend themselves, 
and striking Serb targets to force them to the negotiating table.57  Eagleburger attempted 
to sell the plan to the United States’ European allies, without success. 
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The Bush administration, starting with the president, and continuing down 
throughout the political appointee ranks of the State Department, never had any intention 
of intervening in Yugoslavia, at least until its last months, after Bush lost the election.  
Those junior officials who did push for intervention went largely unheeded, at least until 
the end, at which point Eagleburger felt taking action would bind the incoming Clinton 
administration to an activist policy, which would be “unfair.”  Had Eagleburger initially 
been less fatalistic about the situation in Yugoslavia, he might have been an effective 
proponent of action within the administration; his experience in and knowledge of 
Yugoslavia would have at least made it impossible to ignore his recommendations.  
Overall, however, the Bush administration was, as Scowcroft said, “heavily national 
interest oriented” and ideologically unwilling to consider becoming involved in the 
conflict in Yugoslavia. 
 To minimize the United States’ involvement, the Bush administration encouraged 
the European Community to take the lead in ending the conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia.  President Bush had many motives for wanting to avoid becoming involved, but 
two stood out as excellent reasons to let Europe take the lead.  The first was that early 
U.S. proposals to deal with the crisis through NATO had been rejected by the Europeans.  
They wished the conflict to be dealt with through EC-U.S. diplomatic channels, and not 
the military alliance.  The EC wanted to step onto the global stage as an independent, 
unified power, and exert its influence over European affairs.  Secondly, the Bush 
administration itself wished to avoid entanglement in the conflict.  Having just finished 
the Persian Gulf War and with an election rapidly approaching, in 1991 the Yugoslav 
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conflict did not present any easy solutions, and could only hurt the administration 
politically.58   
 Diplomatic use of NATO, though the European Community opposed it, would 
have lent a much needed threat of force to back the diplomacy carried out in 1991 and 
early 1992.  According to David Gompert, a staff member of Bush’s National Security 
Council, the United States’ willingness to go along with the Europeans’ policy of not 
involving the alliance, 
… contradicted and undermined its declaratory policy regarding the centrality and 
purpose of NATO in post-Cold War Europe, [which] implied NATO responsibility to 
respond to precisely the sort of conflict by then raging in the Balkans.59
 
The Bush administration had asserted that NATO and the United States would continue 
to take active interest in European affairs.  In keeping itself out of the conflict in the 
Balkans, the United States very quickly broke that promise.  Part of the impetus was that 
the conflict was viewed within the administration as a regional dispute, and not 
something which was critical for the United States to take an active role in.60   
 Baker’s brief trip to Belgrade in June 1991 reinforced the administration’s belief 
that the conflict should be handled regionally.  His advice was ignored by all the leaders 
he met with, and embittered him to the whole region.  After that trip, he had little or no 
interest in dealing with Yugoslavia, and discouraged attempts at dealing with the conflict 
inside the administration.  He strongly believed it was Europe’s problem, and should 
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remain that way.61  He commonly expressed his frustration with and desire to stay out of 
the conflict by saying “We don’t have a dog in this fight.”62
 
“The Hour of Europe” 
 
 The Europeans themselves were initially enthusiastic about taking on the Balkan 
conflict.  On the eve of an EC diplomatic mission to Belgrade, Luxembourg’s foreign 
minister declared “The hour of Europe has dawned.”63  Secretary of State Baker recalled 
that,  
It was time for the Europeans to step up to the plate and show that they could act as a 
unified power.  Yugoslavia was as good a first test as any.64
 
Unfortunately, Europe was not up to the task.  This became strikingly clear when 
Germany forced the rest of the EC to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in late 1991.  
Despite the promise of Maastricht, the Europeans did not have a common foreign policy, 
though their desire to maintain the appearance that they did forced them to reluctantly 
recognize the new Balkan states.  The European states could agree that “maintaining a 
united front was more important than any particular outcome in the Balkans,” but little 
else.65   
 Gompert recalled that the failure of the European Community only strengthened 
the United States’ desire to stay out of the conflict: 
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Washington wanted the EC to succeed, but the clearer it became that the EC could not, 
the less eager the United States was to see the alliance [NATO], and thus itself, saddled 
with a no-win problem.66
 
The Bush administration was so anxious to stay out of Yugoslavia that it refused even to 
send an observer to the peace talks held in late 1991, because doing so might imply U.S. 
involvement.67  As a result, the Europeans formed policy on the Balkans, while 
Washington stood back and watched.  However, without the backing of American 
diplomatic and military power, the Europeans could not effectively resolve the conflict.68  
They were divided, with the British and French sympathetic to the Serbs, and the 
Germans favoring the Croats and Slovenes.69  Additionally, Europe was not used to 
making major foreign policy decisions on its own; for the past forty-five years, the 
United States led the way and more or less informed Europe what it would be doing and 
asked for its support, while making it clear that it would go ahead anyway.70
 So by the spring of 1992, as the conflict spread to Bosnia, 
Most American decisionmakers had come to recognize that there was no “European” 
diplomacy to speak of. … Yet anxious to avoid involvement themselves, they persisted in 
deferring to European leadership that was nonexistent.71
 
The pattern held throughout most of the remaining year of Bush’s term; the only notable 
exception is the attempt by acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to sell a “lift and strike” 
plan to the Europeans just as the Bush administration was leaving office.  Other than that 
last minute, half-hearted effort, though the United States publicly called for an end to the 
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fighting, and pressed for better humanitarian access, it deferred to European attempts to 
halt the conflict. 
 Those in the State Department who pushed for a tougher line thought they were 
making headway in July 1992 when reports of concentration camps first found their way 
to the press.  However, the administration, stressed State Department spokesman Richard 
Boucher, never considered using force, either to end the conflict or liberate the camps.72  
President Bush’s pledge, to “not rest until the international community has gained access 
to any and all detention camps,” carried no threat of force, and was made in response to 
domestic outrage, not a desire to do anything about the situation.73  So even when 
presented with evidence that events which appeared similar to the Holocaust were taking 
place in Europe, Bush was so anxious to stay uninvolved that he refused to do more than 
call for “access” to the camps.  The European Community was supposed to take the lead 
in Yugoslavia, to fill the vacuum left by the United States, but it was unable to do so.  
President Bush was simply not interested in what happened in Yugoslavia, and continued 




President Bush was a foreign policy president.  It was his and his 
administration’s, “area of expertise, interest, and passion.”74  That overwhelming interest 
became one of Bush’s largest vulnerabilities during his reelection campaign in 1992.  Bill 
Clinton, with his famous “It’s the economy, stupid” mantra, was criticizing Bush for not 
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paying enough attention to domestic issues, especially the economy.  Though Bush was 
recognized and respected as a world leader, he was vulnerable as an American leader.   
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States had almost carte blanche 
influence in the Balkans; without the threat of Soviet intervention, Bush would have had 
almost no serious international opposition to solving the Balkan crisis.  By early 1992, 
Bush was forced to take into account domestic pressures against intervention, mostly 
coming indirectly from Clinton.  While Clinton advocated taking a harder line on Bosnia 
– including military action – he also kept up his criticism of Bush for neglecting domestic 
problems.75  President Bush was caught in a no-win situation.  Becoming involved in the 
Yugoslav conflict to the extent necessary to stop the war would require a serious 
commitment, and the attention of the administration – precisely the kind of attention 
Clinton was criticizing him for not directing towards domestic affairs.  At the same time, 
the administration remained convinced that military intervention would lead to a 
Vietnam-like “quagmire.”76  Finally, President Bush did not want a second war during his 
first term in office.77  The highly successful Persian Gulf War had just been completed, 
and Bush did not want to lead the country through another war, especially one which had 
the potential to be much more complicated and treacherous for U.S. forces, in a place he 
knew and cared so little about. 
Clinton’s calls for action, however, mixed with the advocacy of some in the 
media and human rights organizations, were embarrassing President Bush.  Especially 
after the Serbs’ concentration camps had been revealed to the public in August 1991, 
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Bush was accused by some of allowing another Holocaust to happen in Europe, of 
breaking the “never again” promise.78  Bush, despite domestic criticism of his policies, 
vowed to “not make one decision based on American politics, election politics ’92.”79  
Such a claim is highly suspicious; presidents facing reelection will almost always 
evaluate their policies in light of the upcoming election.  This is doubly true if the policy 
area is not ideologically or personally important – as Yugoslavia was not within the Bush 
administration.   
Evidence of Bush’s concern about American politics comes from analysis of 
public attitudes during the conflict.  President Bush believed the public identified with the 
crisis as a humanitarian disaster, not a war of aggression, and tried to reinforce that 
view.80  He then concentrated on providing humanitarian relief, and not pressing for 
military action.  Public opinion, however, moved ahead of Bush and by August 1992 over 
half favored including U.S. troops in a peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia.  By winter, 
the percentage was over two-thirds.81  President Bush still refused to participate in a 
peacekeeping mission, believing it would inevitably draw the United States deeper into 
the conflict, and damage his reelection chances.  Secretary of State Baker summed up the 
administration’s aversion to military action, and its strategy to cite what it believed was 
strong public backing for staying out of Yugoslavia, when he asserted that in any military 
intervention in Yugoslavia, the cost in American lives  
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“would have been staggering … the necessary support by the American people for the 
degree of force that would have been required in Bosnia could never have been built or 
maintained.”82   
 
Yugoslavia was simply not important enough to Bush for him to consider any military 
action, especially in an election year.83
Though the Bush administration had plenty of reasons not to become involved in 
Yugoslavia, the election, and the criticisms leveled by Clinton, certainly reinforced those 
reasons in the minds of Bush and his advisors.  Though public opinion by late 1991 
supported participation in a United Nations peacekeeping force, the administration’s 
determination not to become involved remained absolute.  The main objective of Bush’s 
policy on Yugoslavia after war had started in Bosnia to keep the United States from 
becoming involved. 
 
“The Vietnam Syndrome” 
 
The military, though it is not as an institution a formal member of the President’s 
foreign policy-making group, can have a large amount of influence; especially when 
represented by someone as respected and popular as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Colin Powell was during the Bush and early Clinton administrations.  The military’s 
almost complete monopoly on military planning and expert estimates for force 
requirements allow an activist leadership to exert influence on policy out of proportion to 
their official duties.  The military’s, and specifically Colin Powell’s, experiences during 
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the Vietnam War influenced the Pentagon’s position on intervention in Yugoslavia, 
which in turn greatly influenced the Bush administration’s policies and rhetoric.84
After Vietnam, the United States’ attitude on interventions of any sort shifted.  
Whereas during the first part of the Cold War, foreign policy planners worried about 
“another Munich” – appeasing an aggressor which eventually leads to a worse situation 
than confrontation – or “another Pearl Harbor” – being caught unawares and unprepared 
by an enemy – successive administrations have been more worried about “another 
Vietnam.”85  Throughout the Yugoslav wars, interventionist arguments were countered 
by the threat of another Vietnam; a war which drew the United States into ever deeper 
involvement without clear objectives or an exit strategy.  This worry was prevalent within 
the Bush administration.  Larry Eagleburger thought intervening in Bosnia would be like 
a “Vietnam – the tar baby.  Something that started out small but kept growing.”86  
Richard Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, said of intervention, “It’s not clear … that it 
could be done at an acceptable cost in terms of U.S. casualties.”87  In general, this attitude 
has been called the “Vietnam syndrome.”88
 Several similarities, or perceived similarities, between Bosnia and Vietnam 
helped reinforce the Pentagon and administration’s comparisons.  First was the 
topography.89  Bosnia is a very mountainous and densely forested country; only a 
relatively small portion of which is suitable for farming or large-scale development.  Its 
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rugged terrain resembles Vietnam rather than Iraq and Kuwait with their open expanses 
of desert.  So rather than encouraging favorable comparisons to the recent overwhelming 
victory in the Gulf War, Bosnia conjured up images of Vietnam. 
Second was the prospect of a limited intervention – air strikes only – becoming a 
full-scale war.  Military planners were worried about what would happen if the United 
States used air strikes, and they failed to halt the conflict.90  In order to avoid being seen 
as impotent, the United States would almost certainly have to deploy ground troops, 
expanding its involvement in the conflict.  Similarly, General Powell objected to any 
military involvement in Bosnia, even enforcing a United Nations no-fly zone or using the 
military to deliver humanitarian aid.91  He was worried about aircraft being shot down, 
and having to mount rescue attempts, further drawing the U.S. into the conflict, and the 
vulnerability of lightly armed troops and aircraft delivering humanitarian aid.  Either of 
these situations could have led to direct military action against the Serbs, drawing the 
U.S. further into the conflict than it wished or planned to be. 
The third similarity to Vietnam which worried administration and Pentagon 
officials was the possibility of a guerrilla war.  This was the most important lesson the 
Bush administration took from Vietnam.  As President Bush said, “I do not want to see 
the United States bogged down in any way into some guerrilla war.  We lived through 
that once.”92  Planners perceived a very real possibility of a guerrilla war developing if 
the United States invaded Bosnia.  The tenacity and effectiveness of Tito’s partisans 
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during World War II against the Italians and Germans was legendary.93  In addition, the 
Yugoslav Army’s (JNA) defensive strategy was to mount a delaying action, buying time 
for the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) to organize and mount a partisan campaign 
against the attackers.94  Policymakers in the Pentagon remembered the effectiveness of 
the Vietcong’s guerrilla tactics and had no desire to become involved in a similar 
conflict. 
Another lesson of Vietnam which influenced the military’s views on the Yugoslav 
conflict was the  
all too personal understanding of what happens, first, when the architects of an 
interventionist policy underestimate the other side, and second, when so many of those in 
the political process who were its architects soon orphan their own handiwork and go on 
to other jobs, leaving the military to deal with a war that no one could get right.95
 
For the military as an institution, the bureaucratic battles of the Vietnam War led to the 
realization that they would be forced to deal with the consequences of military 
involvement in Yugoslavia, especially if it became politically unpopular.  Political 
leaders could again place the blame on the Pentagon for mishandling a war the military 
did not want in the first place.   
General Powell’s response to these possibilities was to test the Bush 
administration’s commitment to intervention, while trying to scare them away at the same 
time.  He did that by providing very high estimates for the number of troops required to 
stop the conflict.  When the Bush administration asked for estimates, he proposed 
numbers as high as 400,000 troops just to enforce a cease-fire.96  Ambassador 
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Zimmermann, an advocate of a more proactive, if not interventionist, policy observed, 
“[the Pentagon] just tossed around figures on what it would take that were both 
unacceptable and, because of who was supplying them, uncontestable.”97  By quoting 
extremely high numbers, Powell hoped to discourage the administration from intervening 
if they were anything less than fully committed.98  Advocates for intervention always 
backed away when presented with such high figures.99
Ensuring the political leaders fully supported intervention, and were willing to 
stand behind it at all costs, was one of the central tenets of the Powell Doctrine, which 
broadly laid out acceptable circumstances for the use of force.  Developed in response to 
what Powell believed were the political and strategic lessons of the Vietnam War, it was 
the model for the Persian Gulf War, and guided the Pentagon and Bush administration’s 
thinking on intervention in Yugoslavia.  Other features of the doctrine – which Powell 
himself has never systematically defined, but is drawn from his speeches and writings – 
are the use of overwhelming force and a clear set of objectives and an exit strategy.100  
Secretary Cheney, arguing against intervention in Yugoslavia, invoked two of the 
questions raised by the Powell Doctrine, asserting that, “It’s not clear what [the soldiers’] 
mission would be. … It’s not clear how you would get them out when it is over …”101  
The lessons of Vietnam, in the form of the Powell Doctrine, guided and limited the policy 
options for Yugoslavia considered by the Bush administration.  Clearly the Gulf War had 
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not, as President Bush claimed, “buried once and for all” the shadow of Vietnam.102  
Interestingly, the same thinking did not apply to Somalia, where Powell backed the use of 
American troops in violation of almost all the doctrine’s principles.103
There was one source of dissent within the Joint Chiefs of Staff against General 
Powell’s beliefs about intervention in Yugoslavia.  Air Force Chief of Staff Tony 
McPeak believed air strikes alone could slow, if not stop, the Serb offensives in Bosnia.  
He had no illusions about defeating the Serbs from the air alone, but believed air strikes 
might be used to balance the Serbs’ overwhelming superiority in arms against the 
Bosnians, or even force them to negotiate an end to the conflict.104  McPeak argued that 
technological advances, primarily in “smart” weaponry, could overcome the obstacles 
posed by weather, terrain, and the heavy forest cover in Bosnia.  Whereas the other Joint 
Chiefs’ frame of reference for using airpower was the largely ineffective bombing in 
Vietnam, McPeak looked to the just-completed Gulf War as an example of what the Air 
Force could do in Bosnia.  McPeak, however, was alone in the Pentagon in advocating 
any sort of interventionist policy.  He was never able to convince any of the other Joint 
Chiefs to support his position, because of the towering influence of General Powell and 
the parallels that were constantly drawn to Vietnam.105
The Bush administration’s refusal to consider the use of force had its roots in both 
the administration’s and the Pentagon’s lingering wariness of Vietnam, the upcoming 
election, the Persian Gulf War, and the administration’s reading of public opinion.  The 
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Bush administration was very forthcoming about its non-intervention policy.  At a press 
conference, Baker stated that “there will be no unilateral use – no unilateral use – of U.S. 
force … we are not, and we cannot be, the world’s policeman.”106  Though at that point 
he only ruled out unilateral force, the administration’s position quickly hardened into a 
refusal to use any force in the conflict.  This was in part due to the European 
Community’s squeamishness about taking sides in the conflict.  Though several European 
nations deployed UN peacekeepers to Croatia in March 1992, and then to Bosnia after 
fighting started there in April, they had no mandate to stop the fighting.107  They were 
there to keep the peace only, and were required to be impartial, even though there was 
little peace to keep in Bosnia and the Serbs were the overwhelming aggressors.108  The 
Europeans had committed themselves to the extent they felt they were morally required 
to, and were unwilling to go further.  The Europeans’ refusal to consider using force to 
stop the conflict left the United States as the only country even considering the use of 
force in any capacity, which the administration quickly backed away from. 
The retreat was so thorough that the Bush administration went out of its way not 
to even suggest it might use force in any context in Yugoslavia.  As Wayne Bert 
observed: 
The Bush administration officials were not only unwilling to commit force to the conflict 
but they were also very careful to avoid specific threats of force, and to go out of their 
way to avoid leaving the impression that a threat was intended.109
 
So while President Bush and others in the government condemned Serb atrocities and 
concentration camps, they never threatened to use force to stop the killing of civilians or 
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open up the camps.  Milosevic and the Serbs could do as they wished in Bosnia; it was 
perfectly clear that neither the United States nor Europe were willing to make the 
commitment necessary to stop the conflict.  Humanitarian aid for the Bosnians and 
sanctions against the Serbs were as far as the international community was willing to go.   
 The few military actions the Bush administration took were designed to be 
militarily insignificant, or to become so due to procedural issues.  Secretary of State 
Baker put together a plan for using force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid in 
Bosnia, but it required both NATO and UN approval.110  Effectively, military action 
under this system could be vetoed by any of the NATO members or the United Nations, 
whose officials in Bosnia were notorious for their caution and hesitancy to use force.111  
The second initiative, to enforce sanctions against Serbia and an arms embargo against 
the entire former Yugoslavia, necessitated the moving of U.S. naval forces to the Adriatic 
Sea, but they did not threaten to interfere in the conflict itself.112  Diplomatically, the 
United States expelled the Yugoslav ambassador, withdrew Ambassador Zimmermann 
from Belgrade, and closed its two consulates in Yugoslavia, but these were punitive 
actions, not preliminaries to or threats of stronger action.113
 Even Bush’s move to enforce the “no-fly” zone over Bosnia just as he was 
leaving office did not promise an end to the conflict; it was a step more akin to the arms 
embargo because it left the Serbs free to do what they pleased on the ground; they just 
could not use their air force to help.  So the Bush administration was involved as far as it 
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wished – minimally – and it ruled out using force to end the conflict.  Lingering 
memories and fears of Vietnam combined with a general distaste for the conflict, the 
region, and the people, as well as a presidential election and the belief that the public 
would not stand for casualties, led the Bush administration to rule out the use of force in 
Yugoslavia.  Given these attitudes and circumstances, it seems inconceivable with 
opposition from the Pentagon, the State Department – with the exception of a few junior 
officials and Eagleburger in the closing months of the administration – as well as 
President Bush, that the Bush administration would have ever used force to stop the 
conflict in Yugoslavia. 
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 President Clinton’s apparent enthusiasm for ending the wars in Bosnia and 
Croatia quickly evaporated once he reached office.  “Lift and strike,” essentially the same 
policy that Eagleburger had tried to sell, was quickly deemed too politically difficult to 
implement.  Having decided that his preferred policy was unworkable, Clinton reverted to 
a hands-off policy that discounted intervention as an option.  Not until the summer of 
1995 did Clinton begin to feel enough political pressure, both domestic and international, 
that intervention became a necessity.  Clinton’s did not base his decision to end the wars 
in Bosnia and Croatia on humanitarian concerns, but rather cold political calculations. 
 




 During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton criticized President Bush 
repeatedly for not doing more to stop the conflict in Bosnia.  During a campaign rally in 
St. Louis, he stated his belief that the United States had an obligation to stop the 
conflict.114  Later, he went so far as to endorse using force to insure delivery of 
humanitarian aid and stop the shelling of Sarajevo.115  In turn, Bosnians placed their 
hopes on Clinton’s election; given his campaign rhetoric, they believed he would use the 
United States’ military power to bring the war to a quick halt.  Unfortunately for the 
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Bosnians, once in the White House, Clinton turned out to be less of a hawk than he was 
on the campaign trail. 
The first Bosnia policy decision the new administration needed to make upon 
taking office was whether to endorse the Vance-Owen Plan.  Cyrus Vance, a former 
Secretary of State for President Carter, and Lord Owen, a former British Foreign 
Minister, represented the United Nations and the European Union, respectively.  Together 
over four months they created the Vance-Owen Plan, which represented a best effort by 
the two international bodies most involved in resolving the crisis.  The plan was based on 
realistic assumptions of what could and could not be done.  It essentially divided Bosnia 
into ten provinces; each controlled by one of the three ethnic groups, with the exception 
of two, one to be controlled jointly by the Croats and Muslims, and Sarajevo to be 
controlled jointly by all three parties.116  Because Vance and Owen knew neither Europe 
nor the United States was willing to use force to insure adherence to the plan, the 
provinces’ borders closely followed the existing front lines.  The plan was first presented 
in January 1993 at a peace conference in Geneva. 
Richard Holbrooke, a former Carter administration official who would later join 
the Clinton State Department and be placed in charge of Bosnia policy, wrote about the 
Vance-Owen Plan to the new foreign policy team shortly after the inauguration.  He 
warned that  
if the Vance-Owen plan is rejected, we must face the fact that the negotiating track is 
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The Clinton administration, however, did almost exactly that.  They denounced the 
Vance-Owen Plan as unacceptable, but presented no alternative and continued to 
maintain that negotiations could end the conflict.  The Vance-Owen Plan, however, was 
the culmination of the best negotiation efforts of the United Nations and the European 
Union, and represented the best hope for a negotiated solution. 
The Clinton administration refused to support the Vance-Owen Plan because it 
allowed the Serbs to retain territory they had acquired by force, in violation of the UN 
Charter. 118  Clinton specifically rejected the plan because it did not “[stand] up against 
the principle of ethnic cleansing.”119  In part, his campaign promises forced Clinton to 
take this position; having attacked Bush for not stopping Serb aggression, he could not 
now legitimize its gains.  The weakness of the plan, however, was the uncomfortable 
reality that neither Europe nor the United States would intervene militarily to enforce 
compliance with a peace agreement.  In the end, it a lack of will on the part of the U.S. 
and Europe forced a plan that was morally unacceptable to the Clinton administration. 
Lord Owen pointed out in an interview with Foreign Affairs that “the fundamental 
[weakness] of America’s criticism of Europe … was that you were employing your high 
moral standard on the basis of absolutely zero involvement.”120  Clinton’s “high moral 
standard” was not a policy in itself, because the United States was unable to propose an 
alternative to Vance-Owen.  Instead, it was a stand on principle for political, not 
practical, reasons, which led to the death of the best peace proposal yet offered.  Had 
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there been a policy behind Clinton’s rejection of Vance-Owen, the plan’s rejection might 
have been a positive step towards a more just solution, instead of a purely negative act. 
Despite promises made during the campaign, and aside from the rejection of 
Vance-Owen, no effective policy on Bosnia was forthcoming when the administration 
took office.  While in its first month the administration still talked passionately about 
solving the problems in the Balkans, they presented no policy.  Warren Christopher, 
Clinton’s Secretary of State, said on February 10 that Bosnia was “an early and crucial 
test of how [the world] will address the critical concerns of ethnic and religious 
minorities in the post-Cold War world.”121  The administration certainly saw itself as 
having responsibilities to stop the conflict; it was just unsure of the best way to go about 
doing so.  Indicative of this was that Christopher, despite calling the conflict a “crucial 
test,” did not threaten to use force, or propose any other initiative.122  Though Clinton had 
called for intervention during the campaign, the consequences of actually making that 
decision were weighing on the new administration.   
 Although the Clinton administration had not yet formulated a policy on Bosnia, at 
least it appeared to recognize that it was a problem – that the United States did have an 
interest in stopping the conflict.  This admission in itself was a step further than the Bush 
administration was ever willing to go, and appeared a hopeful sign to those advocating 
intervention.  Though the use of force was apparently not being considered at that 
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moment, Clinton had called for it during the campaign, and so it could not have been 
entirely out of the question. 
 Tony Lake, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, admitted that the first few 
months after taking office were very frustrating.  He was an advocate of intervention, 
though a quiet one.  Lake and his national security staff, 
kept looking for something – reading and rereading everything there was 
about the area – and it just wasn’t there.  So we would go back and try 
again, looking for some as yet undiscovered opening, for something new 
that we could do, and it wasn’t there.123
 
Militarily the administration was stalemated by Europe, much as the Bush administration 
had been.  Unless the United States committed troops to UNPROFOR, Europe was 
unwilling to allow the United States to use air power to stop the conflict.  The Europeans 
would not allow their troops to be put in greater danger by the United States unless it was 
willing to share in the consequences.  With several thousand troops in Somalia at the 
time, courtesy of President Bush, Clinton was in no position to make a troop commitment 
to Bosnia, even if he were inclined to.   
 Still, there were voices trying to convince the administration to adopt an activist, 
interventionist policy in Bosnia.  Among them was Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor and 
prominent activist.  At the opening of the Holocaust Museum in April, discarding his 
prepared notes, he turned and spoke directly to President Clinton: 
Mr. President, I cannot not tell you something.  I have been in the former Yugoslavia last 
fall.  I cannot sleep since what I have seen.  As a Jew I am saying that.  We must do 
something to stop the bloodshed in that country.124
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Wiesel knew he was seeing genocide happen again, in Europe, despite the “never again” 
promise which had been repeated ever since the end of World War II.  That Wiesel 
addressed Clinton at the opening of the Holocaust Museum, which in part was an 
acknowledgment of the United States’ unwillingness to take action before and during the 
war to save the lives of Jews in Europe, should have driven home to Clinton the 
seriousness of what was happening in Bosnia.  Instead, Clinton called for an end to the 
conflict, but remained unwilling to commit the United States to anything: 
Ethnic cleansing is the kind of inhumanity that the Holocaust took to the nth degree, I 
think you have to stand up against it.  I think it’s wrong.  That does not mean that the 
United States or the United Nations can enter a war.125
 
In the absence of an easy policy option, Clinton called for the world to “stand up against” 
what was happening in Bosnia, but did not lay out a plan, or even suggest an option, for 
stopping the conflict.  As the war in Bosnia became a year old, the administration 
continued to dodge any responsibility to intervene in the conflict. 
 In May of 1993, about four months after assuming the Presidency, Clinton finally 
decided on a course of action.  The administration’s policy was “lift and strike,” almost 
the same plan junior officers in the State Department had tried to sell to Eagleburger in 
the closing days of the Bush administration and were still pushing.126  The policy entailed 
lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, while keeping it in place against 
Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, and using air strikes to force the Serbs to negotiate a 
solution.  Clinton believed the plan could be sold to the public if he could convince the 
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Europeans to go along with it.127  Selling the plan to the Europeans, however, was the 
problem.  When Eagleburger had promoted a similar policy in the last days of the Bush 
administration, he was met with stony resistance.  The British argued that lifting the arms 
embargo would actually widen the war, while the UNPROFOR nations maintained that 
air strikes would put their troops at risk unnecessarily.128
 Despite the international opposition, Clinton’s policy did receive domestic 
backing from a somewhat unlikely source.  Bob Dole, then the Senate minority leader 
and a passionate advocate for intervention in the Balkans, supported “lift and strike.”  He 
argued that several American interests were at stake in Bosnia, specifically the threat that 
Milosevic, if not stopped, would turn on Kosovo; that Islamic fundamentalists were using 
the West’s inaction in Bosnia to recruit followers; and that “the United States and its 
allies had signaled that borders could be changed by force with no international 
consequence.”129  With at least some bipartisan support, Clinton sent Christopher to 
Europe in May to sell the new policy to the United States’ allies.   
 Christopher’s mission to Europe was not in the usual spirit of post-World War II 
transatlantic relations concerning vital American interests.  Usually, when such a senior 
figure came to Europe, it was to announce a policy the United States had decided to 
adopt, and to ask for European approval, and if necessary, help.  However, the policy was 
usually already decided; a Secretary of State did not go to Europe to ask permission; 
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rather he came to inform.  If the Europeans supported the proposal, all the better; if not, 
the United States had already decided on its course of action, and that would be that.130
 This trip, however, was genuinely to ‘consult.’  Christopher’s job was to sell the 
policy to the Europeans, who were not receptive.  While the Europeans raised their usual 
objections about using American air power while their troops faced the risk on the 
ground, it became clear that Clinton was not fully behind his own policy.  This was 
obvious to Christopher, who actively disliked the policy, and he consequently did a poor 
job convincing the allies to accept it.131  The plan died in the middle of Christopher’s trip, 
when Clinton himself reneged on the policy, pulling out whatever support was coming 
from Washington.132  Clinton had reportedly read Robert Kaplan’s book Balkan Ghosts, 
which left him with the impression that the hatreds and conflicts in the Balkans were 
inevitable and unsolvable.133  Having been handed a good excuse not to pursue a policy 
that was receiving little support from the reluctant Europeans, Clinton quickly abandoned 
“lift and strike.” 
 Upon returning to Washington, Christopher told Clinton that if the Europeans 
were to go along, they would have to be told “that we have firmly decided to go ahead 
with our preferred option and that we expect them to support us.”134  A European 
diplomat concurred with Christopher when he said that Clinton “should stop asking 
[Europe] their opinion on what he plans to do and start telling them instead what he plans 
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to go ahead with, preferably with their support.”135  Essentially, the power relationship 
would have to return to the norm; “consulting” would not work when the Europeans were 
reluctant to act, they would have to be told.  Clinton, who had lost interest in the policy 
by that time in any case, let the matter drop. 
 “Lift and strike” was to be the one interventionist policy which was even 
seriously considered within the White House until the summer of 1995.  After the 
administration’s disavowal of the Vance-Owen Plan and its initial dithering over 
adopting a policy, the abrupt end of “lift and strike” signaled the end of consideration of 
intervention for well over a year.  It also crushed the hopes of those, in Bosnia, Europe, 
and the United States, who hoped Clinton would live up to his campaign promises by 
being more attuned to humanitarian causes, and would stand up to rulers like Milosevic.  
As Wayne Bert observed, “[Clinton’s] bold statements during the campaign appeared in 
retrospect to reflect more the partisan needs of the moment than a well thought out 
policy.”136  It seems that Clinton, searching for any advantage against Bush, grabbed 
Bosnia as an issue without having a real commitment to solving the problem.  So when 
obstacles developed to the Clinton administration’s initial policy and it looked as it if 
reaching a solution would take a considerable amount of time and effort, Clinton decided 
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Awaiting a Consensus 
  
In terms of policy interests, Bill Clinton was almost the exact opposite of his 
predecessor.  President Clinton was passionate about domestic politics – the issues on 
which he won the Presidency – while President Bush was passionate about foreign 
policy.  In many ways, their differences marked perfectly the transition which took place 
at the end of the Cold War.  Without the constant threat of the Soviet Union, American 
politics turned inward, and concentrated on domestic issues.  Clinton’s election was the 
indisputable signal of this change.  As Governor of Arkansas, Clinton had almost no 
experience or interest in foreign policy.  One of the major themes of his 1992 campaign 
was criticism of Bush’s overwhelming interest in foreign affairs.   
 There were early signs of Clinton’s disinterest in foreign policy, despite his 
criticism of Bush for neglecting the Yugoslav crisis and calls for an interventionist policy 
there.  One of the earliest was Clinton’s acceptance speech at the Democratic National 
Convention in 1992, which included just 141 words on foreign policy, out of 4,200.137  
Once in office, it became clear that Clinton’s main initial foreign policy goal was to avoid 
foreign policy.  The administration’s early hesitance on developing a policy for Bosnia 
reflected this, as did the relatively low priority it was given over the next few years.  
Much closer to Clinton’s heart were his plans for domestic reform, which he feared 
would be superseded by an active and ambitious foreign policy agenda.138   
 Having little interest or experience in foreign policy, Clinton had little agenda of 
his own.  Trade issues were the only foreign policy issue that seemed to grab his 
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attention.  Clinton’s lack of interest meant he largely left policy decisions to subordinates 
in the State Department and National Security Council.  Those subordinates were largely 
policy-makers from the Carter administration, such as Warren Christopher, Anthony 
Lake, Sandy Berger and Richard Holbrooke.139  Having been out of power for the past 
twelve years, there was a shortage of young, proven, Democratic talent in foreign policy 
circles.  Reliance on these old hands, particularly Christopher, led to what was widely 
seen as a weak foreign policy team, in which Clinton consequently did not place a great 
deal of trust.140  This situation suited Clinton perfectly; his foreign policy team would not 
be comfortable enough to push major policy initiatives that might undercut his domestic 
priorities.  When foreign policy decisions had to be made, Clinton preferred to wait until 
his advisors formulated and agreed upon a plan.141  He was not comfortable taking the 
lead on foreign policy decisions, and preferred to adopt mutually agreeable proposals 
instead of advocating one position. 
 A Secretary of State serving in an administration that does not place much 
importance on foreign policy has to be very loyal to the president and his desire not to let 
foreign policy become an issue.  Warren Christopher was seen as being extremely loyal, 
“the perfect deputy, a man whose own personality and thoughts were always in the 
shadows.”142  He tried to read the president’s wishes and act accordingly instead of taking 
initiative and pushing his own agenda.  This attitude made him the perfect choice for 
Clinton’s Secretary of State.  He was relatively meek, deferring to others, a perfect fit for 
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a position that did not hold a great deal of importance in Clinton’s administration.  
Richard Holbrooke commented on Christopher’s interaction with other administration 
officials: 
“Christopher preferred to let others take the lead in recommending a 
course of action, while he focused on the risks it entailed. … Christopher 
reached his conclusions only after careful deliberations …”143
 
If Clinton wanted reasons not to intervene in Bosnia, Christopher was surely the person 
to provide them.  His cautious and deliberative nature led him to reject calls for an 
interventionist policy from within the State Department, which he knew Clinton did not 
wish to adopt.  Christopher, much as Baker had been before him, was attuned to the 
President’s priorities, and would not push Clinton into adopting a policy he did not 
support. 
 With Clinton and Christopher disinterested in the Yugoslav crisis, the other senior 
member of the foreign policy team, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, was the 
only one who supported intervention.  The Third World was Lake’s passion, and though 
he did not have experience in Yugoslavia as Scowcroft had, he was deeply concerned 
about the conflict.  Situations like this – the tough issues with no easy solutions – were 
why Lake was involved in foreign policy.144  However, Lake, like Christopher, responded 
to what Clinton wanted, which was to keep foreign policy below the radar and off the 
front page of the newspapers.145  Lake was deeply frustrated by Clinton’s policies, but 
remained a quiet advocate of intervention.146  He knew if he spoke out too loudly, he 
 
143 Holbrooke, 80. 
144 Halberstam, 284. 
145 Ibid, 196. 
146 Ibid, 284; Power, 316. 
50 
                                                
would lose whatever influence he had with Clinton, and that would not serve his purpose 
at all.  Instead, he quietly researched and encouraged others in the National Security 
Council to think about possible solutions. 
 The only two other senior administration officials who advocated intervention 
were Vice President Gore and UN Ambassador (and future Secretary of State) Madeline 
Albright.  Neither of these officials, despite their stature, was able to make a significant 
impact on Yugoslav policy.  Gore, who gained considerable foreign policy experience in 
his twelve years as a Senator before becoming Vice President, refused to challenge 
Clinton in public.  He would not question Clinton’s policies during meetings, when he 
might have been able to garner support from others, but waited for private meetings with 
the President before stating his views.147  Ambassador Albright, though a passionate 
advocate of intervention, was based in New York, and as such, was an outsider to the rest 
of the foreign policy team and did not carry a great deal of influence.148   
 With foreign policy viewed as a hindrance to the Clinton administration’s 
objectives, and no one with influence in the White House willing to press the issue of 
intervention, an attitude developed where no policy could be agreed upon unless all the 
senior administration officials supported it.  Clinton was unwilling to lead, and his 
obvious lack of enthusiasm for the subject kept others from making Bosnia an issue.  
Lake, in explaining why there was so little proactive movement on policy after “lift and 
strike” died, said “There was no unanimity within the government on the issue …”149  
Without a consensus on policy within the Cabinet, Lake was not willing to recommend a 
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policy to a reluctant President Clinton.  Neither Lake, Albright, nor Gore were willing to 
appeal to the public in an attempt to create a consensus, or at least create some pressure 
on Clinton and others who were wary of intervention.  Instead of leading, “Clinton’s 
foreign policy team awaited [a] consensus,” which was never likely to appear.150
Adding to the absence of an effective, vocal supporter of intervention among 
senior foreign policy officials were the fundamental changes in political attitudes toward 
foreign affairs that came with the end of the Cold War.  As David Halberstam observed: 
As the Soviet threat to the United States receded, so, too, did the political 
support for any kind of foreign policy issue that was not immediate in its 
import.  A generation was coming of age in Congress who cared less about 
foreign affairs, elected by a generation of voters who cared less, and 
reported on by a media that paid less attention.151
 
This shift in attitudes, though it started during President Bush’s term, did not have as 
great an impact upon him as it did upon Clinton.  Clinton was of this generation, and 
fully represented it.  He was less passionate about foreign affairs than the presidents who 
served during the Cold War, and was fully conscious of the waning support foreign 
policy enjoyed domestically.152  As Stephen Walt pointed out, Clinton understood and 
responded well to the new domestic political attitude: 
The foreign policy of the Clinton administration has been well suited to an 
era when there is little to gain in foreign policy and much to lose.  The 
American people recognize this and have made it clear they want neither 
isolationism nor costly international crusades.  Bill Clinton is nothing if 
not sensitive to the vox populi, so he has given his fellow citizens the 
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While Walt’s characterization that “there is little to gain in foreign policy” is 
questionable – after all, maintaining the United States’ standing as the only remaining 
superpower and using that power as a tool to make the world better seems like quite 
something to gain – his characterization of Clinton is correct.  Clinton was very sensitive 
to public opinion, and his sense that what happened in Bosnia would not have serious 
domestic repercussions reinforced his desire not to become involved.   
 The downgrading of foreign affairs in general led to the importance of more 
mundane foreign policy priorities than solving the crisis in Bosnia.  The priority when 
discussing Bosnia was, according to Gore, “The need for us to protect and preserve the 
alliance [NATO].”154  That the top priority for the Clinton administration was the survival 
of NATO, despite the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, which it was 
formed to counter, and not ending the conflict in Bosnia, was a sharp about-face from the 
humanitarian rhetoric of the campaign.  But the Clinton administration’s decreased 
interest in European affairs also reflected the Europeans’ impatience with “their 
dependence on America … which [explained] their renewed effort to forge a more 
formidable defense capability,” and their “growing recognition that Europe should handle 
most of its own regional security problems without calling for American assistance.”155  
This attitude made sense until the European Union’s split over recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia in the summer of 1991.  After that, the need for American leadership, no 
matter how much Clinton and the European Union pretended it was not needed, was 
apparent.  The Clinton administration and its defenders might have cited Europe’s desire 
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to handle the crisis without the United States’ involvement, but it had obviously failed by 
the time Clinton took office. 
 Clinton was very well attuned to the political attitudes of the country, and with no 
overarching foreign policy agenda, allowed public reaction to foreign policy be his guide.  
The conflict in Bosnia did not have a significant impact on Clinton’s political fortunes 
until much later.  Until then the potential damage that an expensive, large-scale foreign 
policy initiative could do to his domestic agenda was the paramount concern.156  Though 
some in Congress and the press were still calling for a more interventionist policy, not 
until 1995 did they create a situation where it became politically costly for Clinton to 
remain uninvolved.  Those responsible for foreign policy, especially Lake and 
Christopher, were aware that Clinton’s primary interest in foreign policy was how it 
affected him domestically, and so they handled Bosnia, like other issues, with a constant 
“awareness of the President’s domestic political fortunes.”157  A State Department official 
admitted as much to Elie Wiesel, saying that, “the survival of the fragile liberal coalition 
represented by this Presidency” was more important than the atrocities in Bosnia.158  The 
absolute importance of domestic politics in the Clinton administration made any 
interventionist policy unlikely to succeed; unless the country was united behind a desire 
to act, Clinton would not lead. 
 Public opinion seemed to back Clinton’s desire not to intervene in Bosnia. 
Surveys indicated that public opinion would have supported air strikes, if they were 
 
156 Halberstam, 204. 
157 Ibid, 241. 
158 Richard Johnson, “The Pinstripe Approach to Genocide,” The Conceit of Innocence: Losing the 
Conscience of the West in the War against Bosnia, ed. Stjepan G. Mestrovic (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1997), 20. 
54 
                                                
carried out jointly with other NATO members.159  However, this was as much as most 
people would support, and in any case, the Europeans would not agree to air strikes while 
their forces were still on the ground and no Americans were present.  As for sending in 
ground troops, Clinton felt that the public would not support any intervention if it 
produced casualties, unless there was a vital interest involved.160  With nothing 
commonly identified as vital interests at stake in Bosnia, Clinton would not step onto a 
limb politically.  It is possible Clinton could have made a difference in public opinion, 
however.  Andrew Kohut and Robert Toth, in studying public opinion polls from the Gulf 
War, Somalia, and Bosnia, found that, 
The patterns of response suggest that early in a crisis the public will seriously consider 
the use of force, but that even when it feels the United States has a responsibility to act in 
its national interest, large percentages (sometimes majorities) will favor no action unless 
they are swayed by presidential leadership.161
 
Had Clinton wanted to intervene, it is possible he could have convinced the public, 
though it would have been a time consuming issue and a difficult political battle.  Any 
intervention would have had to be “well planned and convincingly argued before the 
American public was likely to accept it.”162  As noted above, Clinton’s interest in Bosnia 
was limited to domestic political repercussions, and in 1993 and 1994 there was little at 
stake politically if he did not act. 
 There was already some support for intervention, but it was very conditional.  Air 
strikes had to be multilateral, and if the United States was to intervene, it had to win – 
there was a feeling, especially in Congress, that if intervention occurred, the United 
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States was not to leave before its goals were accomplished.163  Additionally, there was 
public support for deploying ground troops as United Nations peacekeepers.  However, 
there had to be a peace to keep; Clinton knew he could not deploy troops as peacekeepers 
into Bosnia while the conflict was continuing.  American troops were pledged to deploy, 
as they eventually did, as part of a peacekeeping force, but only after a peace treaty had 
been signed.  There was little support for putting American troops in Bosnia while the 
conflict continued.164 Kohut and Toth found that 
… the public will be clearly disposed to act militarily in two situations: if it feels 
America’s vital interests are at stake, and if American military force can provide 
humanitarian assistance without becoming engaged in a protracted conflict.  The 
peacekeeper role evokes an ambiguous response, but the public strongly rejects the 
peacemaker goal.165
 
Faced with a situation where the military predicted a protracted conflict and the lack of 
perceived vital interests, public support for peacemaking, had it been seriously proposed, 
would have been minimal at best. 
 There was also continuing pressure from the military not to intervene.  Until 
General Powell retired in October 1993, he maintained the same line on Bosnia that he 
had under President Bush: the conflict was apt to become another Vietnam, and the 
United States had no business intervening militarily, to say nothing of using ground 
troops.166  Powell’s unreasonably high estimates for the number of troops it would take to 
enforce a peace treaty did not decrease, because he was even more certain that Clinton 
did not have the will to see the conflict through than he was about Bush.  The lack of will 
on Clinton’s part made it even easier to use inflated troop projections to counter any push 
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for intervention.  Added to those advantages Powell had enjoyed over the Bush 
administration was the Clinton administration’s lack of experience in military matters, 
and their wariness of the military in general.167  Clinton, who had avoided military 
service in Vietnam, did not hold much moral authority in military matters, and his 
campaign promise to allow gays to serve in the military had further undermined his 
support in the Pentagon.168  
 The Clinton administration’s problems with the military point towards a number 
of similarities with the Bush administration.  Not only were Clinton and his advisors 
wary of getting involved in “another Vietnam,” but they also began to talk about ancient 
ethnic hatreds and national interests, in much the same way Brent Scowcroft had under 
Bush.  Secretary Christopher described the conflict as being motivated by “ethnic 
hatreds,” and said: “The hatred between all three groups … is almost unbelievable.  It’s 
almost terrifying, and it’s centuries old.  That really is a problem from hell.”169  Though 
Christopher did not have the experience in Yugoslavia that Scowcroft or Eagleburger 
had, it should have been clear enough by 1993, almost two years after the conflict started, 
that any ancient hatreds involved had been resurrected for political advantage, and the 
conflict was not some natural occurrence which could not have been avoided and must 
simply be allowed to run its course.  To the Clinton administration, however, this line 
was a convenient excuse for not taking action, just as it was for Bush.   
 After Clinton’s brief consideration of the “lift and strike” policy and the 
humanitarian rhetoric that went along with it, his administration quickly turned to 
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echoing the Bush administration’s national interest considerations.  As Sarajevo seemed 
ready to fall to Serb forces in the summer of 1993, Secretary Christopher told a State 
Department press briefing that “The United States is doing all that it can consistent with 
its national interest.”170  While only two months before Christopher had been on a trip to 
Europe to sell the “lift and strike” policy, which would have directly aided the Bosnian 
government, he now suggested that any military action was out of the question, even 
when the existential survival of the Bosnian government was in question.  It seemed that 
an almost complete reversal had occurred in the space of less than two months, and with 
it went all of the humanitarian rhetoric that marked Clinton’s campaign and the first few 
months of his administration. 
 The Clinton administration defined their national security interests in the region 
very narrowly, and in a remarkably similar way to how the Bush administration defined 
theirs.  First was, as Gore had said, the survival and credibility of NATO in Europe after 
the Cold War.  Until 1995, credibility and survival were almost by definition conflicting 
goals, and survival of the alliance was deemed the more important of the two.  The 
second security interest was containing the war – keeping it from spreading to Kosovo, 
which might bring Greece and Turkey into the conflict.  Last was the deterrence of others 
who might want to exploit nationalist tensions in the new international system, though 
this goal does not seem to have been well served by allowing Milosevic and the Bosnian 
Serbs to continue their aggression in Bosnia.171  These interests are notable mostly for the 
absence of any concern about respecting international law or the welfare of those in 
 
170 Power, 310. 
171 Bert, 69. 
58 
                                                
Bosnia.  Scowcroft at least acknowledged that preventing genocide was within the 
national interest, while Clinton refused to do so. 
 In general, it seems that what happened in Bosnia was not deemed important 
enough to warrant the effort necessary to stop the conflict, but at the same time could not 
be ignored.172  Therefore, the administration claimed to be doing what it could, 
“consistent with our national interest,” which meant there was to be no use of force.   The 
administration seemed willing to do little more than extend gestures, such as supporting 
the United Nations peacekeeping effort, because the conflict was not linked to national 
security.173  The great hope for the rise of a humanitarian foreign policy, which had first 
shown itself and then been denied during the Bush administration, seemed not to have 
gained any greater traction during the first years of the Clinton administration. 
 As there was during the Bush administration, there were some dissenters within 
the government.  Many were the same junior State Department officials who dealt with 
the conflict every day, knew it best, and had pushed for action under Bush.  During the 
campaign and Clinton’s first few months in office, they were hopeful, as the Bosnians 
had been, that the new President really meant to keep his promises and would reverse 
Bush’s policy.  By the time “lift and strike” fell apart in May 1993, however, they 
realized there would be no quick intervention.174  These junior officials believed the 
United States did have interests at stake in the former Yugoslavia, and disagreed with 
their superiors’ desire to keep the conflict out of the spotlight.  Lord Owen summed up 
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their argument on the interests involved in Bosnia during an interview with Foreign 
Affairs:  
You cannot be involved in Europe, as you are through the North Atlantic Treaty and 
other institutions, and simply walk away from the Balkans.  Conflict here still has the 
potential to involve two countries that matter a great deal to America: Greece and 
Turkey.  … Also, ethnic cleansing has created one of the biggest moral problems for the 
world since the Holocaust.  Our collective shame about our handling of the Jews’ plight 
means you, as the world’s leader, and your values-based foreign policy, are now engaged 
in safeguarding Muslims – rightly and inevitably so.175
 
Owen and the state department officials pushing for intervention saw, first, that it was 
better to halt the conflict before it came any closer to spreading to Greece and Turkey, 
and second, that the moral questions raised by the conflict were a vital interest.  
Unfortunately, these views, though prevalent at lower levels in the State Department, 
were simply not being heard at the decision making level, or when they were heard, were 
quickly dismissed. 
 The policy Clinton and his foreign policy team adopted after the demise of “lift 
and strike” can best be described as ‘containment.’  Essentially, the Clinton 
administration decided to let the two sides fight, as long as the conflict stayed within the 
former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Kosovo.176  Using much the same criteria for 
determining national interests as the Bush administration had done, the Clinton 
administration came up with a policy very much like Bush’s.  It was less costly politically 
for Clinton to do nothing about Bosnia, just as it was for Bush to ignore it during his 
reelection campaign.  The only difference between the Clinton and Bush policies was the 
rhetoric that accompanied them.   
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 Clinton had criticized Bush for paying too much attention to foreign policy and 
too little to domestic issues during the campaign.  At the same time, however, Clinton 
managed to outline a more ambitious, more humanitarian foreign policy than Bush ever 
practiced.  Once in office, Clinton was forced to reevaluate, and it became apparent his 
goals were unattainable because of his mandate for domestic reforms.177  Clinton simply 
could not accomplish an overhaul of both domestic and foreign policy with a reasonable 
expectation of success.  Even though the policies did not change, the rhetoric the 
administration used was more appropriate to an ambitious, activist policy outlook.  James 
Gow wrote of the relationship between Clinton’s rhetoric and his policy: 
Instead of harmonising its policy preferences with both the degree to which it was 
prepared to make practical commitments and with its allies and partners in the 
international community, the [Clinton] White House had a tendency to pronounce on 
principle, prevaricate in practice and preempt the policies and plans of others.178
 
Clinton’s talk about intervening in Bosnia during the campaign and in the first months of 
his administration conflicted sharply with the policy eventually adopted – to do nothing.  
Meanwhile, Clinton had undercut the United Nations’ and the European Union’s best 
effort at bringing the conflict to a close – the Vance-Owen plan.  The Bush administration 
had at least made clear it was not considering intervening in Bosnia; they had been 
upfront about their policy from the start, while Clinton’s administration had publicly 
proclaimed its desire to end the conflict, if necessary by using military force, then not 
followed through. 
 Although Christopher did not return from his European trip with any endorsement 
for lift and strike, he did agree to a policy with the Europeans.  Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, 
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Zepa and Gorazde, all Bosnian Muslim towns, were to be designated United Nations 
“Safe Areas,” as Srebrenica had been in April 1993.179  The idea was that Serbs could not 
attack these towns, most of which were under siege and threatened by the Serbs.  Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, the UN Sercretary General, estimated that 30,000 troops would be needed 
to enforce the cease-fires in these towns.  However, only a small number were actually 
deployed, and those troops were under-armed and had no mandate to protect the civilians 
in the safe areas.180  The UNPROFOR troops had a traditional peacekeeping mandate that 
was completely inadequate for the situations in which they were placed in Bosnia.  Their 
rules of engagement were limited to firing in self-defense, which allowed the combatants, 
usually Serbs, to do whatever they wanted to the civilian population; unless the UN 
soldiers were directly fired upon, they could not respond.181  This situation was a 
travesty, which was made even worse by the name of the UN force – the United Nations 
Protection Force. 
 Despite the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR, the United States voted for 89 
resolutions in the Security Council which addressed Yugoslavia, including several which 
expanded UNPROFOR’s mandate.182  Clinton and his team had decided that by making 
the United Nations primarily responsible for the security of Bosnia, they could avoid 
having to take a direct, active role.  Leaving the crisis to the United Nations, especially in 
the face of its inability to deal effectively with Bosnia, shows how desperate Clinton was 
to stay away from foreign policy in general, and Bosnia in particular.  For the President in 
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1993, it appeared to be a no-lose situation.  Domestic pressure was not sufficient to make 
nonintervention a problem, while forcing the United Nations to take the lead held little 
risk because the United States did not have troops on the ground in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
 This policy would, however, at best maintain the status quo. There was little real 
hope that the United Nations could stop the conflict on its own; the United States had 
already undermined its diplomacy, and its military forces were weak and did not have a 
mandate to impose a solution.  The junior officials in the State Department who had been 
so hopeful when Clinton was first elected became increasingly frustrated.  Richard 
Johnson and Jim Hooper talked about the need for the United States’ active engagement 
and the use of military force at a State Department open forum: 
If the conflict reflected legal and constitutional differences over the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, creative diplomacy and split-the-difference negotiations would offer 
promise. … But the conflict is driven by a Serb bid for racial and national supremacy. As 
such, it can be halted, reversed, and defeated only by military force.183
 
Hooper and Johnson’s position better reflected the realities of the situation than did the 
administration’s reliance on the United Nations.  As Marshall Harris, the desk officer for 
Bosnia, observed, “The Clinton policy was unrealistic, but nobody wanted to change 
it.”184   
 Met with resistance coming from the Secretary of State and the White House 
when they tried to find new policy solutions, the junior officials knew they could 
accomplish little within the system.  This realization led Harris to resign in August 1993 
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in protest of the administration’s handling of the conflict in Bosnia.  He was determined 
that Clinton could overcome the obstacles to intervention if he tried:  
“I think the administration would be surprised what it could accomplish if it confronts 
this issue head on.  When it adopts a defeatist mode … it’s going to get defeatist 
results.”185   
 
Harris was soon followed by two others: Jon Western, who had analyzed intelligence on 
Bosnia since the war broke out in 1992, and Steven Walker, the Croatian desk officer.  
The three resignations were the largest ever defection from the State Department.186  
Even Vietnam had not provoked an exodus of this magnitude from the ranks of foreign 
service officers.  The difficulty of entering the Foreign Service, and the consequent status 
of an elite group, made resignations on principle uncommon and very provocative.187  
Though the resignations did not force a change in the administration’s policy, they did 
give the public a glimpse of the divisions within the State Department and embarrass 
Secretary Christopher. 
 Only when an event occurred which could not be ignored would Clinton 
momentarily become engaged in the conflict.  Such an event happened in February 1994, 
when sixty-nine civilians were killed by a single Serb shell in a Sarajevo marketplace.188  
Clinton declared a heavy-weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and threatened air 
strikes against the Serbs if they resumed shelling.  In his speech announcing the exclusion 
zone, he even acknowledged that the slaughter of civilians in Bosnia “affects our 
interests.”189  The ultimatum worked, as the shelling of Sarajevo stopped for a time.  
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However, the Serbs had negotiated away the exclusion zone – the artillery around 
Sarajevo remained in place, and was only nominally under UN ‘control.’190  The true test 
of the new US and NATO policy was to be how they responded if the Serbs opened fire 
again on Sarajevo, which they did a few months later.  By that time, Bosnia was no 
longer on Clinton’s list of priorities, and there were no air strikes.191  A pattern had been 
set for the Clinton administration’s engagement in Bosnia: Clinton would become 
interested and take an active role only during a crisis, and then his attention would wane 
as the crisis subsided, leaving no permanent change in policy. 
 The Bihac pocket in northern Bosnia became such a crisis in November of 1994.  
Despite being a UN-protected safe area, the Serbs were threatening to overrun it.  It was 
obvious to all involved that UNPROFOR troops were neither capable nor had the 
mandate to stop the Serb advance.  The administration and National Security Advisor 
Lake in particular pushed for air strikes against the Serbs threatening the pocket.  Once 
again, the Europeans, who were unreceptive to air strikes unless the United States 
committed ground troops, rebuffed them.192  Clinton was not willing to push the NATO 
allies enough to have the use of air strikes approved, so despite Lake’s activism, air 
strikes were once again ruled out.  Lake saw the pattern that had developed whenever air 
strikes were threatened, and concluded at the end of the year that, “The stick of military 
pressure is no longer viable.”193   
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 If the administration was willing to push hard enough and get air strikes approved, 
as it did in a few cases during the spring and summer of 1994, the Serbs retaliated with 
atrocities carried out on Muslim civilians and by rounding up UNPROFOR 
peacekeepers.194  The humiliation caused by the kidnapping of peacekeepers was 
especially indicative of how ineffective the UN force was – they were too lightly armed, 
had a weak mandate, and were led by generals and civilians who viewed the use of force 
with abhorrence, even to protect themselves or civilians.  Lake understood that under 
current conditions, there was no reasonable option for a military solution imposed by 
NATO or the UN. 
 The Clinton administration did take one significant step towards ending the 
conflict in March 1994.  It engineered a Muslim-Croat federation, stopping the fighting 
between the two sides that had broken out in October 1992.195  The new federation 
allowed some weapons to be smuggled into Bosnia for the Bosnian Army and 
encouraged joint military operations against the Serbs.196  The United States, as it had 
been when it rejected Vance-Owen, was once again working against the Europeans and 
the United Nations.  Generally, the EU and UN favored a cease-fire at any cost, without 
consideration for the amount of territory held by either side.  The United States was still 
seeking a morally equitable solution, and so favored arming the Bosnians and Croats in 
an attempt to role back Serb gains before achieving a final resolution.  By the summer of 
1995, the Muslim-Croat federation would begin to regain territory lost to the Serbs at the 
beginning of the war. 
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 In sum, after the failure of the “lift and strike” policy, Clinton largely retreated 
from his ambitious campaign promises on Bosnia.  A variety of factors, some new, but 
many the same that influenced Bush, kept the administration from following through with 
a more activist policy.  Particularly influential was Clinton’s sensitivity to the political 
cost of committing troops to what might be a costly and long-term peacemaking 
operation.  Only when an atrocity occurred which created pressure for the United States 
to act would Clinton become engaged, but his attention would quickly shift.  The 
Europeans’ continuous refrain that the United States should not carry out air strikes 
without having troops on the ground frustrated the one policy Clinton was willing – at 
various points, though by no means consistently – to adopt.  All three of these situations 
would have to change for a military solution to become a viable option again.  A 
diplomatic solution seemed unattainable barring the surrender of the Bosnian Muslims; 
the British Lt. General Rose, in command of UNPROFOR, had learned from experience 
that all agreements, verbal or written, were worthless in the Balkans.197  American 
intervention, which seemed the only viable way to end the conflict, was held back by 
several considerations, all of which would have to be overcome.  It would take a series of 
significant crises and changes in priorities to change Clinton’s policy, which did not 
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As the summer of 1995 approached and the Bosnian conflict entered its fourth 
year, pressure built on the United States to take a more active role.  The United Nations 
and the European Union had proved spectacularly unable to end the conflict.  Abroad, a 
new French President, Jacques Chirac, assumed office and immediately denounced the 
international community’s, and especially the United States,’ efforts in Bosnia.  On the 
ground in Bosnia, UNPROFOR was becoming increasingly unviable; its troops were 
abducted at will by the Serbs and held as hostages to deter air strikes, and the European 
nations which made up the force were contemplating withdrawal.  In the United States, 
Clinton began to feel the pressure of the 1996 election, which would take place in a little 
over a year, and changing public and congressional attitudes about the conflict.  Inside 
the administration, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, was increasingly 
frustrated by the administration’s inability to deal with the conflict, and set about to 
formulate a policy on his own.  Late in the summer, the east Bosnian town of Srebrenica 
was overrun, leading to the massacre of about 8,000 Muslim men.  Finally, in August, the 
Croatians recaptured the Krajina, which had been captured by the Serbs in 1991, and 
shattered the myth of the Serbs’ military strength.  All of these changes led to American 
intervention at the end of August 1995, which swiftly brought an end to the war. 
 But few of these pressures were immediately apparent in the spring of 1995.  To 
be sure, the public was aware of the tragedy occurring in Bosnia, and the Europeans 
knew the status quo could not last, but the foreign policy decision makers in Washington 
were still floundering.  At least some of the problem could be traced to Clinton, “whose 
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humanitarian instincts had, in the past, put him on one side [of an interventionist policy], 
but whose political caution had then brought him back to the other.”198  There was a 
recognition that something had to be done; Clinton’s lack of will in Bosnia had  
surely contributed to a successful resistance to American power in 
Somalia, which in turn emboldened the Chinese, then the Haitians, next 
the Koreans, the Cubans, and finally the Iraqis to test American 
intentions.199
 
However, the realization that Bosnia was hurting the United States’ standing in the world 
was still not enough to force the adoption of an interventionist policy on the still reluctant 
Clinton.   
The first event that eventually triggered a more forceful policy was the election of 
Chirac in May 1995.  Chirac, who had served in Algeria during the colonial war, had a 
very proper sense of how the French military should conduct themselves.200  He would 
not stand for them to be captured without a fight, chained to Serb artillery and 
installations to prevent air strikes, and then negotiated for by the UN.201  Chirac’s sense 
of purpose in Bosnia was as much, if not more, related more to maintaining the honor of 
the French military and state as it did to genuine humanitarian concern.202  Whatever his 
motivations, Chirac immediately pushed for a more active mandate for UNPROFOR, and 
became the public leader on the issue that had been missing for so long. 
Chirac began criticizing Clinton for his lack of leadership.  NATO, which had 
been effectively dormant for so long on the issue, was now looked upon as the best hope 
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of resolving the conflict.  However, Chirac declared, “There is no leader of the Atlantic 
alliance,” when asked if the United States was living up to its responsibilities, suggesting 
Clinton was the largest obstacle to intervention.203  Suddenly the tables had turned on 
Clinton.  The relatively comfortable position that he had assumed, that he wanted to do 
more, but was being held back by the Europeans, was turned around.  Chirac genuinely 
wanted to resolve the conflict in Bosnia, and rightly called Clinton out for not doing 
more.  In London, Chirac announced the new French policy on its involvement in Bosnia 
on July 21: 
We can’t imagine that the U.N. force will remain only to observe, and to 
be, in a way, accomplices in the situation.  If that is the case, it is better to 
withdraw.204
 
Chirac embarrassed Clinton by directly challenging his leadership of NATO and with his 
proactive Bosnia policy.  Even more stinging than his comment about Clinton’s 
leadership of NATO was another remark, that “the position of leader of the free world is 
vacant.”205  American presidents had held that unofficial title unquestioned among their 
allies since World War II.  Chirac’s comment was designed to force Clinton into taking a 
more active role; surely losing the respect of the rest of the world would have political 
repercussions domestically, even if Bosnia itself did not. 
 As the need to “protect and preserve” NATO was driving the United States’ 
policy in Bosnia, French pressure changed the political calculation.206  Suddenly, the best 
thing for NATO was not to allow the status quo to continue, but to find a way to extricate 
 
203 Power, 436. 
204 Holbrooke, 71. 
205 Halberstam, 305. 
206 Woodward, The Choice, 255. 
70 
                                                
the NATO members from the former Yugoslavia.  There were two basic ways to 
accomplish this: withdraw from UNPROFOR and let the mission fall apart, then start 
over on Bosnia with a clean slate, or find a way to end the conflict with UNPROFOR still 
on the ground.  Of the two, the preferred choice was to find a way to stop the conflict 
without withdrawing UNPROFOR.   
 Though leaving UNPROFOR on the ground would complicate any military plan, 
the consequences of extracting the force were far greater.  First, withdrawing the force 
would signal that the United Nations had completely failed to stop the conflict.  It would 
be leaving the Bosnians on their own until an allied military intervention could be 
launched, if it were launched at all.  However, the most important consideration for the 
United States was NATO’s Operations Plan 40-104.  President Clinton had promised a 
force of about 20,000 U.S. troops to help withdraw UNPROFOR if it became necessary.  
The Operations Plan was part of the NATO planning structure, and as such, it would be 
an automatic deployment if the United Nations pulled out of the former Yugoslavia; if 
Clinton decided to veto the troops’ deployment, he would break a NATO commitment, 
and quite possibly destroy the alliance.207  Clinton was caught in a terrible situation, one 
that he had strove to avoid ever since taking office.  His options were quickly dwindling; 
it looked as if he would have to deploy troops to Bosnia one way or another.  Richard 
Holbrooke, then serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European 
Affairs, recalled his reaction upon learning of the NATO commitment: 
General Estes’ briefing [on OpPlan 40-104] convinced me that it would no 
longer be possible to stay out of Bosnia.  To assist in the U.N.’s 
withdrawal, which would be followed by an even greater disaster, made 
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no sense at all.  Using American ground troops to fight the war was 
equally out of the question.  …  It was a terrible set of choices, but there 
was no way Washington could avoid involvement much longer.208
 
Having avoided becoming involved in the conflict for the first two years of his 
administration, Clinton suddenly found time running out, largely due to the belated 
recognition in Europe that the situation was unsustainable. 
 It was not only foreign affairs, however, which pressured Clinton to change his 
policy.  To Clinton, domestic policy and politics was all-important, and foreign policy 
was generally evaluated in terms of its domestic effects.  The political price which 
Clinton had to pay for not intervening in Bosnia was beginning to rise, and would 
increase consistently as the summer progressed.  In June, only 33 to 41 percent of the 
public approved Clinton’s handling of Bosnia.209  Bosnia was unlikely to be a deciding 
factor in the 1996 presidential election, but it had repercussions nonetheless: 
Bosnia was not an issue in and of itself.  Not many Americans were likely to go to the 
polls in the 1996 presidential election and vote one way or another because of events in 
Sarajevo or Srebrenica.  Rather, its importance was more complicated than that, for it 
appeared to suggest something larger and far more devastating, an impotence on the part 
of the Clinton administration not just in this, but in all matters.210
 
Clinton had precious few policy successes in the first half of his first term in office.  His 
national health care plan was defeated, the United States withdrew from Somalia 
humiliated, and Bosnia was a constantly festering problem.  There was a need for a great 
accomplishment, something dramatic, which would raise the President’s standing at 
home and abroad. 
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 Public and policy experts’ attitudes toward intervention were also shifting.  By 
June, an overwhelming 78 percent of Americans believed U.S. troops should aid the UN 
in Bosnia, given that they remained under U.S. command.211  Following this trend, a list 
of twenty-seven non-governmental organizations in the United States issued a press 
release calling for military intervention in Bosnia.  The groups included Human Rights 
Watch, the American Jewish Committee, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, Physicians for Human Rights, and even the Quakers.212  Many of these 
organizations had never before advocated the use of military force, but believed the 
situation was so dire that no other option was sufficient.  The combined prestige of these 
organizations, many of which had monitored the conflict closely, was enormous, and 
created pressure on the Clinton administration.  Even Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s National 
Security Advisor, declared that the situation called for intervention, even if it meant 
suffering American casualties.213  Other conservatives, especially in the press, also added 
their voices to the calls for action.  When Clinton began to be criticized by those on the 
neoconservative right as well as on the left, it became apparent that his position was 
untenable.214
 Political advisors quickly caught on, and realized that leaving Bosnia unresolved 
could endanger Clinton’s reelection.  Dick Morris, a pollster and political consultant, told 
the White House staff during the summer of 1995 that Bosnia would have to be solved 
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before the election.215  Bob Dole pressed this message home by criticizing Clinton in 
much the same way Clinton had criticized Bush in 1992.  However, Dole had more 
leverage to force action than Clinton had in 1992.  From his seat in the Senate, Dole 
introduced a bill that called for the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
Muslims.216  The countries that committed troops to UNPROFOR had made it clear that 
if the embargo was lifted they would withdraw their troops, which would lead to the 
implementation of the dreaded OpPlan 40-104.217  Dole eventually backed down 
somewhat, and amended his bill to take effect only after the UN withdrew, or twelve 
weeks after the Bosnian government requested their withdrawal.218  So even if the bill did 
not immediately threaten to force the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, it did have dramatic 
consequences for the President.  Half of the democrats in the Senate had supported the 
bill, which passed by a veto-proof 69-29.219  The vote took place on July 26; just over 
two week after the fall of Srebrenica and after reports of the atrocities there had been 
widely publicized, and was a devastating rebuke of Clinton’s policy, especially by the 
democratic Senators. 
 Even before Congressional pressure affected the administration’s views on its 
Bosnia policy, some in the administration recognized the need for a change and were 
trying to develop a solution.  Tony Lake, who had become immensely frustrated by 
Clinton’s unwillingness to tackle the difficult Bosnia problem, finally took the initiative 
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himself.  The administration’s foreign policy team had always acted in a crisis mode; 
they were “pragmatic at heart [and] would handle foreign policy issue by issue, with no 
guidelines …”220  Making foreign policy in that way meant that Clinton’s team was 
constantly responding to crises, and not planning for the long term, so Lake instructed his 
staff to figure out where they wanted to be in six months and then work backwards to 
figure out how to accomplish their goals.221  The goals they established were a 51-49 
percent territory split between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serbs and 
redeploying UNPROFOR to minimize its exposure in case force was needed.  The plan 
was called the ‘Endgame Strategy.’222
 Once the basic outline of the policy was completed, Lake took the policy directly 
to Clinton, going around Secretary of Defense Perry, Secretary of State Christopher, and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, who had replaced Powell in 
October of 1993.223  Lake knew that his plan would not win consensus within the Cabinet 
without backing from Clinton, so his end-run was the only way to gain approval.  Lake 
had discussed the plan with Ambassador Albright, and she encouraged his efforts.  With 
her active support, Richard Holbrooke’s consistent support for intervention, and Gore’s 
desire to find a solution to the conflict, Lake felt as though his policy might be able to 
win firm backing from Clinton.224  Once Clinton gave his approval, the other Cabinet 
Secretaries would have to fall in line.  Lake also realized that he would have to take a 
more forceful stance with the NATO allies.  ‘Consulting,’ as Christopher had done on his 
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aborted trip to sell lift and strike, would never work.  He needed a mandate from Clinton 
to say that Endgame is the United States’ policy, and would carry it through with or 
without the support of the Europeans.225  All of this required much more decisive action 
than Clinton had ever taken on Bosnia.  Though he had momentarily supported activist 
policies in the past, such as “lift and strike” or the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, he 
had backed off from them rather quickly when faced with opposition.  What was needed 
was something which grabbed the United States’ and the world’s attention, and removed 
inaction as a policy option. 
 On July 11, the surrounded Muslim town of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia fell 
almost unopposed to Serb forces under the command of General Ratko Mladic, an 
indicted war criminal.  Although it was a United Nations protected safe area, General 
Janvier in Sarajevo refused to grant requests for air strikes from the beleaguered Dutch 
garrison protecting the town.226  The 370 Dutch troops were operating under 
UNPROFOR’s mandate, which forbid them to open fire unless directly fired upon.  They 
could not protect the 40,000 Muslims inside Srebrenica because they possessed only light 
weapons and were almost out of fuel and food, which the Serbs had refused to allow into 
the town.227  So the Dutch could do little but stand by as the Serbs entered Srebrenica and 
began bussing women and young children to the Bosnian Muslim front lines near 
Tuzla.228  All the men left in the city – about 15,000 had taken to the woods in a 
desperate attempt to escape, where many were hunted down by the Serbs – were killed 
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and buried in mass graves.229  In all, at least 7,000 Muslim males were slaughtered, either 
after being captured in Srebrenica or after being hunted down in the surrounding 
forests.230
 When the women and children deported from Srebrenica began to tell their 
stories, along with the trickle of men who reached Tuzla after walking from Srebrenica, 
the rest of the world raised its voice in disgust and horror.  Pressure from all sides to put a 
stop to the conflict and punish the Serbs became intense, especially upon Clinton.  On 
July 14, three days after Srebrenica fell, Clinton, while practicing golf on the White 
House lawn, told National Security Council deputies Sandy Berger and Nancy Soderberg 
that “This can’t continue. … We have to seize control of this [Bosnia]. … I’m getting 
creamed!”231  Finally, the political cost, always the primary consideration for Clinton, 
had become great enough to warrant action.  A few days later, at a foreign policy 
meeting, Clinton declared, 
This policy is doing enormous damage to the United States and our standing in the world.  
We look weak.  The only time we’ve ever made progress is when we geared up NATO to 
pose a real threat to the Serbs.232
 
Though Clinton still saw the conflict as a political and not a humanitarian crisis, at least 
he finally acknowledged that military action needed to be taken.  Lake, having already 
gotten the p 
President’s approval for his plan used the opportunity to finally present his Endgame 
Strategy.   
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 John Shalikashvili, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was not as 
opposed to the new, bolder policy as Powell would have been.  Shalikashvili had opposed 
the “lift and strike” policy because it would have lead to ever-increasing involvement – 
much the same reasons Powell cited in his opposition – but changed his mind after 
Chirac’s election and the massacres at Srebrenica.233  With Chirac even more active than 
Clinton on Bosnia, Shalikashvili suddenly found a more receptive tone when discussing 
intervention with other NATO officers.  He even went so far as to suggest a massive 
strike against Serb air defense targets as the first step in a larger campaign, an idea which 
was widely supported within NATO.234  With the military now onboard – Secretary of 
Defense Perry shared Shalikashvili’s new enthusiasm for a more forceful policy – a 
major obstacle to intervention had been cleared.  For the first time, both the President and 
the military were working towards intervention. 
 Part of the reason for Shalikashvili’s change of heart was the destruction of the 
myth of Serb military prowess.  Beginning in May 1995, the Croatians launched a 
campaign to take back the territory they had lost four years earlier.235  At the beginning of 
August, Croatia launched another offensive, this one retaking almost all of the territory 
lost in 1991 in just four days.236  Milosevic refused to support the Croatian Serbs, and the 
JNA stayed out of the fight.237   
The Pentagon had feared the JNA, and used it in part to justify its opposition to 
intervention.  As the third or fourth-largest army in Europe, it was not to be brushed aside 
 
233 Halberstam, 326. 
234 Ibid, 327. 
235 Silber & Little, 355. 
236 Halberstam, 339-40. 
237 Power, 438. 
78 
                                                
lightly.238  However, by 1995, the army had given much of its equipment and manpower 
to the Bosnian Serbs.  It was also brought entirely under Milosevic’s control, and when, 
during the Croatian offensives it became clear that Serbia itself would not intervene, the 
JNA was completely removed from picture.  The Bosnian Serb forces were not of the 
same quality as the JNA.  Though the nucleus had been formed from former JNA 
officers, many of the forces were paramilitary groups, some youth gangs from Belgrade, 
who were poorly disciplined and often drunk.239  When Croatian and Bosnian forces 
launched offensives against the Bosnian Serbs in August 1995, they were immensely 
successful.  By mid-September when the Americans instructed the Bosnian and Croat 
forces to end their offensive, the Serbs controlled only about 45 percent of Bosnia, down 
from 70 percent just a few weeks earlier.240  It was apparent that NATO would not face a 
significant threat from either the JNA or the Bosnian Serb army. 
After Srebrenica, there was a general agreement among the UNPROFOR 
members that the mission could not continue as it had.  Chirac had made it clear the 
French intended either to find a solution to the conflict or withdraw from UNPROFOR.  
The British, too, who had been very reluctant to sanction the use of force, were more 
receptive to the idea after Srebrenica.  At the London Conference in July 1995, a meeting 
of foreign ministry and defense officials from the NATO member states, Lake introduced 
his Endgame plan to the other delegations.  With the strong support of Clinton, the other 
NATO members agreed to the plan, which promised to use “substantial and decisive air-
power” if Gorazde, another eastern Bosnia safe area, was attacked.  However, there was 
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no mention of the other safe areas, particularly Zepa and Sarajevo.241  Zepa was deemed 
too difficult to defend, and was written off; it fell to Serb forces on July 27.242  Initially 
Sarajevo was also not included in the ultimatum, though it and the other remaining safe 
areas were subsequently added at the insistence of the United States.243  The other 
accomplishment of the London Conference was removing the “dual key” system which 
placed a veto on the use of air strikes in the hands of United Nations officials, particularly 
Yusushi Akashi, U.N. Secretary Boutros-Gali’s special representative in Bosnia, who had 
refused numerous requests for air strikes in the past.  All of the decision making power 
now rested with NATO commanders, who were less reluctant to use force.244   
On the ground in Bosnia, UNPROFOR re-deployed to form units greater than a 
thousand soldiers each, and left Serb-controlled territory.  These steps removed the 
liability the Europeans had complained about for the last four years whenever air strikes 
had been proposed.245  The troops were essentially worthless in Serb territory in any case, 
“where they were achieving almost nothing besides serving as potential hostages” in the 
event of air strikes.246  The concentration and re-deployment of the UNPROFOR troops 
removed the last significant barrier to air strikes against the Serbs. 
With the policy now in place, all that remained was a provocation to test the 
allies’ commitment.  It came on August 28, when a Serb shell killed thirty-seven people 
in downtown Sarajevo.  Richard Holbrooke, whom Lake had appointed lead negotiator in 
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mid-August, immediately recommended air strikes against Serb targets.  There was no 
serious opposition, and NATO began bombing on August 30.247  The bombing stopped 
three weeks later, and on November 21, the Dayton Accords ending the war were 
initialed.248  Just over three months after NATO began its campaign against the Serbs, a 
war which had dragged on since the summer of 1991 – over four years – was finished. 
Though many factors combined to push the Clinton administration to take action, 
there was a fundamental realization within the top policy makers – especially Clinton and 
Lake – that Bosnia was hurting Clinton politically.  That realization convinced Clinton, 
who had been at best inconsistent in his stance on the appropriate policy, that a solution 
was needed.  Clinton later recalled his reasoning: 
You have to ask yourself which decisions would you rather defend ten years from now 
when you’re not in office …   I would rather explain why we tried [to intervene] than 
why … we permitted the war to resume, it expanded, NATO’s alliance was destroyed, 
and the influence of the United States was compromised for ten years.249
 
At no point did Clinton defend his decision on humanitarian grounds.  To the end, 
Clinton relied on the national interest argument, which he had argued against so strongly 
during his 1992 campaign.  Those who did believe that the United States had a duty to 
intervene based on humanitarian grounds – Lake, Gore, Albright, and Holbrooke – were 
pushed aside until Clinton realized he had to take action. 
 Even though Clinton was the first president to take office after the end of the Cold 
War – and partly because he was – the United States did not consider humanitarian crises 
more favorably than it had in the past.  In part because the framework for international 
relations for the past fifty years – the confrontation between the United States and the 
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Soviet Union – was gone, domestic issues immediately took center stage.  Clinton had 
neither the political capital, will, nor interest to make a substantive change in the United 
States’ fundamentally national interest-based foreign policy.  At the time when change 
was most possible, it was also, because of who was elected and the public’s changing 
attitudes toward foreign affairs, unlikely that a fundamental change would happen. 
 International considerations did not have nearly as large an impact on Clinton’s 
choosing to stay out of the conflict as did personal and domestic factors.  Though 
international politics did play a restraining role, especially while the “lift and strike” 
policy was being considered, at no point were they absolute enough that a committed and 
decisive president could not have overcome them.  After all, Europe was accustomed to 
having the United States dictate policy on major international issues, and in some 
instances wished that it would do so again.  Clinton’s disinterest in foreign policy and 
consequent lack of leadership was a major reason the crisis in Bosnia, and within NATO, 
became as severe as it did.  Early on, not taking action may have done more harm than 
forcing Europe to accept a plan it did not approve of would have. 
 In the end the real losers were, of course, the Bosnians.  With the United States 
unwilling to assert its almost absolute political and military advantage to aid 
humanitarian causes, and the United Nations completely ineffective, the Bosnians were 
left on their own.  Perhaps the greatest travesty of all was the embargo on weapons 
imports to the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, which severely crippled the 
government’s ability to defend itself.  If the international community had not wanted to 
invest itself in solving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, it should have stayed out 
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completely.  The half-measures that were taken – such as UNPROFOR – allowed the 
United Nations, Europe, and the United States to pretend they were fulfilling their duty to 
stop the fighting and protect civilians, when in reality they were doing neither. 
 Those who did have a genuine commitment to ending the conflict were not 
sufficiently powerful, or assertive enough, to overcome objections and change policy.  It 
must remain speculation what might have happened in 1993, had Clinton really believed 
his campaign rhetoric, and followed through with “lift and strike.”  One can imagine that, 
had the proposal been delivered as an already adopted policy to the Europeans, and 
UNPROFOR re-deployed as it was in late 1995 into large units, that the war might have 
ended substantially sooner.  There is at least one piece of evidence the war might have 
ended much sooner, and at a relatively low cost.  Radovan Karadzic, President of the 
Bosnian Serbs’ Republika Srpska, said that ten thousand NATO troops deployed in two 
strategic places within Bosnia would have quickly stopped his campaign.250  To do so, 
however, would have required an amount of political will that was simply not present on 
either side of the Atlantic. 
 The political will, the sense of how important it is, not only to save human life, 
but to uphold international law was missing from all the actors in the former Yugoslavia.  
The first leader to speak forcefully about the need to change directions in Bosnia was 
Jacques Chirac, who stood his ground on a patriotic, not a humanitarian basis.  When 
Clinton eventually followed, he cited national interest and domestic political concerns 
instead of a concern for human rights.  Under Clinton, despite his liberal ideology, his 
new foreign policy team, and his position as leader of the only superpower, the United 
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States simply did not view the suffering of a people in Southeastern Europe as worthy of 
the inconvenience it would cause to create peace. 
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The lessening Cold War tensions of the late 1980s, and the end of the conflict in 
the early 1990s, lowered the strategic importance of client states of both the United States 
and the Soviet Union in Africa.  Among the states affected was Somalia, and then ruled 
by the dictator Siad Barre, who was backed by the United States as a counterweight to 
Soviet-supported Ethiopia during much of the 1980s.251  A civil war broke out in 1988 
between Barre and General Mohammed Farah Aidid, which quickly destroyed the central 
government’s tenuous control over the clan-dominated country.252  With Somalia’s 
strategic importance lapsed, the United States took little interest in the civil war.  It did 
not threaten any interests of the United States in the region, which were by then minimal 
in any case.253
 Humanitarian crises, however, were gaining more and more attention around the 
world, both from the press and from governments.  So while African states were less 
likely to receive political, military and economic aid in the post-Cold War world, they 
received a fair amount of attention if there happened to be a humanitarian tragedy, as was 
the case in Somalia.254  Though Siad Barre was forced out of the country in the spring of 
1992, the civil war did not end.  General Aidid fought with other clans for supremacy; 
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though he was the most powerful leader, he could not establish control over the entire 
country. 255   
 The Bush administration initially opposed intervening in Somalia.  The lack of a 
clear national interest at stake, as well as a general wariness of humanitarian interventions 
was enough to keep Bush and his advisors from taking a risk there.  Only with domestic 
political pressure from the coming presidential election mounting did Bush approve very 
limited support for the UN mission.  After his defeat by Bill Clinton, Bush ordered an 
intervention of precisely the kind he had refused earlier, both in Somalia and in Bosnia.  
However, once he was out of office, the intervention lost focus, and eventually resulted in 
the deaths of several soldiers and the withdrawal of all American troops, leaving the 
country in much the same situation it had been in before Bush’s intervention. 
 
The Bush Administration: Intervention on the Cheap  
 
 By Februrary 1992, there were large numbers of civilian casualties, especially in 
Mogadishu, where it was estimated that there were about 30,000 casualties, mostly from 
random shelling.  However, the attention of the international community did not focus on 
the humanitarian tragedy until people began starving in the spring and summer of 
1992.256  However, the Bush administration refused to support a peacekeeping operation 
in Somalia during the spring of 1992.257  Not until late April was a peacekeeping force, 
known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), mandated, and even 
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then, it was limited to 50 personnel at the demand of the United States.  Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had requested 500.258   
During the summer months, it became clear that neither UNOSOM nor Security 
Council resolutions had any effect on the situation.  Relief organizations’ efforts were 
hampered by the various clans, which confiscated aid destined for civilians.259  
UNOSOM was not strong enough to protect the humanitarian aid; instead, it relied on 
cooperation with Aidid and the other clans, which often stole the supplies for 
themselves.260  By the end of 1992, aid agencies estimated that the various militias and 
gangs looted eighty percent of their supplies.261
 By August, nearly one quarter of the Somali population was threatened with 
starvation, and 300,000 people had died, including one of every four children under the 
age of five.262  Boutros-Ghali told the Security Council in late July that one third of the 
Somali population would die if the United Nations did not take more forceful action.263  
The Bush administration’s hopes that the situation could be either ignored or placated 
with a token peacekeeping force did not seem to be realistic.  Somalia was widely 
acknowledged to be the worst humanitarian disaster in the world at the time, and not a 
situation the UN could take a pass on.264
 In response to the increasingly desperate situation in Somalia, President Bush 
ordered a limited U.S. intervention on August 14, 1992.  He pledged logistical support for 
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500 Pakistani peacekeepers – the rest of the force Boutros-Ghali had wanted in the spring 
but the United States refused – and to transport aid to Somalia.265  The operation was 
christened “Provide Relief” by the Bush administration.  The United States pledged to 
offer support throughout the fall, but declined to provide guarantees beyond that.266   
 The intervention was seen in some quarters as a way to, in the middle of a tight 
presidential campaign, “demonstrate [the White House] had a heart,” and to “do it 
relatively cheaply.”267  The timing reinforced this impression – the Republican National 
Convention was held just a few days after Bush decided to intervene.  But presidential 
politics also restrained the parameters of Operation Provide Relief.  The election was still 
primarily about domestic issues, and Clinton was pounding Bush on the amount of time 
he spent on foreign policy.  The administration did not wish to give Clinton more 
ammunition by launching a major and open-ended commitment in Somalia.268
 However, the Bush administration was also under pressure from the media and 
public opinion.  Media attention on Somalia during the summer had been intensive, and 
had a negative impact on the Bush administration’s position before the election.269  So 
caught between two opposing forces – wanting to do something positive about a conflict 
which received so much attention, and at the same time not wanting to be drawn too 
deeply into any further international commitments – Bush decided to take on an 
extremely limited role. 
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 The newly reinforced UNOSOM proved to be almost as ineffective as the original 
mission, U.S. logistical support notwithstanding.  Over the next few months, the 
Pakistani peacekeepers proved unable to protect the aid supplies they were assigned to 
deliver.  They were hampered by their lack of firepower and their traditional 
peacekeeping mandate.270  As a small, lightly armed force, the Pakistanis could not take 
on the militias that prevented them from delivering food, and were forced, much as the 
smaller UNOSOM contingent had been, to rely on cooperation with the various clan 
leaders.  Pressure began to build again for some sort of further intervention, despite the 
wariness of the White House and the Pentagon. 
In September 1992, President Bush gave a speech to the United Nations in which 
he outlined his ideas for enhanced UN peacekeeping capabilities, and acknowledged that 
the United States must be willing to play a substantial role, both financially and 
militarily.271  The situation in Somalia seemed to beg for the kind of attention Bush 
outlined in his speech.  He could not leave Somalia in the hands of an ineffectual UN 
force after outlining his ideas for making the UN a more effective peacekeeping 
organization.  When he made the decision to intervene, Bush was careful to couch it in 
terms of supporting the UN, and not as a unilateral U.S. project: 
… some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, [and] 
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Bush recognized that the United States must play a leading role in encouraging the UN 
and other states to take on difficult humanitarian crises, and was willing to provide the 
leadership necessary in this situation to allow the UN to intervene more robustly. 
 Congressional pressure, which largely reflected domestic opinion, was also 
influential in encouraging Bush to intervene.  Senators Paul Simon and Nancy 
Kassebaum introduced a bipartisan resolution calling for United States military forces to 
be deployed in Somalia to safeguard the delivery of food.273  The resolution passed the 
Senate in late July, before Operation Provide Relief, but the Senators were not satisfied 
by the half-measures Bush took then, especially as the Pakistanis proved unable to 
guarantee the delivery of the aid.274  Congressional pressure was backed by public 
opinion.  A poll taken in late November, just after Bush decided to send U.S. troops to 
Somalia, showed that seventy percent of the public believed the situation in Somalia 
warranted the risk in U.S. lives and the cost to deploy them.275   
 Within the bureaucracy there was low-level support for intervention, as there was 
for Bosnia – though it failed to find support among the senior decision-makers.  The 
Office for Disaster Relief and the Africa Bureau within the State Department both wanted 
the United States to intervene, though by all accounts they had little influence.276  Of 
more importance were the cables that Ambassador Smith Hempstone, stationed in 
neighboring Kenya, sent to the President.  In them, he described the desperate situation in 
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Somalia and urged action.277  These appeals were made before the August intervention, 
but nevertheless raised Bush’s awareness of the bleak outlook for the civilians of 
Somalia. 
  Presidential politics and the conflict in Bosnia were related and important issues 
for Bush.  Somalia acted almost as a relief valve for pressure on Bosnia.  Not only did the 
August intervention come right before the Republican National Convention, but it also 
came just as the concentration camps in Bosnia were being revealed to the public in the 
first week of August, and Clinton’s campaign took advantage of Bush’s inaction there.278  
The Bush administration was adamantly opposed to intervention in Bosnia; so 
intervention in Somalia became a way of deflecting both international and domestic 
criticism.279  Brent Scowcroft acknowledged as much: 
It [the Bosnian concentration camps] probably did have a significant impact on us.  We 
did not want to portray the administration as wholly flint-hearted realpolitick, and an 
airlift in Somalia was a lot cheaper [than intervention in Bosnia] to demonstrate we had a 
heart.280
 
Scowcroft also offered two national security reasons why Somalia was attractive as a 
place to intervene: first, it would show the world that the U.S. was not afraid to intervene, 
and second, that the Bush administration did care about Muslims and the third world.  In 
particular, the administration felt the need to refute accusations that the United States did 
not intervene in Bosnia because the victims were primarily Muslim.281
 All of these explanations help explain the intervention in August and the 
administration’s increasing willingness to look at a more robust intervention in Somalia 
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thereafter.  However, the Pentagon, as it had in Bosnia, stood absolutely opposed to 
intervention in Somalia throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 1992.  The 
administration’s very limited intervention in August was partly predicated on the 
assumption that the Pentagon would remain opposed to the idea of deploying troops in 
Somalia, Bosnia, or any other humanitarian crisis that did not meet the stringent criteria 
of the Powell Doctrine.282   
 The Pentagon did initially play its predicted role, familiar from the limited 
discussions of intervention in Bosnia, of opposing a troop deployment on the basic 
grounds of the Powell Doctrine.  Initially, the Pentagon cited the lack of a clearly defined 
mission, and the presence of what one State Department official called a “clan-based 
quagmire destined to last years, if not decades” as reasons to stay out of Somalia.283  
Surprisingly, given the just-completed Persian Gulf War, the Pentagon argued that the 
desert terrain would create logistical and operational difficulties that would make the 
mission more difficult.284  These arguments stifled discussion of an American troop 
deployment to Somalia; as in Bosnia, the Bush administration was not willing to force an 
intervention on the unwilling Pentagon. 
 There was a change of heart in the Pentagon in mid-November that changed the 
situatio completely.  The evidence seems to indicate that Bush’s loss in the 1992 
presidential election played a large part in this.  General Powell decided, based on 
Clinton’s campaign rhetoric and early briefings after the election that Clinton’s 
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administration would almost inevitably become involved in either Bosnia or Somalia.285  
Given the possibilities, Powell decided that Somalia was the better of the two situations 
to become involved in; it seemed easier to limit the mission’s mandate, to get in and then 
out of, and to resolve, than was Bosnia.286   
 The comparative advantages over Bosnia were a clear mission – the United States 
could, and did, start almost from scratch with its mandate – open terrain, and a poorly 
armed and trained militia opponent.287  In contrast, intervention in Bosnia would require 
either following or changing the UN mandate; the fighting would be in heavily forested 
and mountainous terrain; and it was possible that the United States would end up fighting 
the JNA.  Given the comparisons, it is not surprising the Pentagon decided it would rather 
involve itself in Somalia.  The Pentagon did not believe intervention in Somalia was 
ideal, just the least worst of its two options.  Observed one admiral involved in the 
discussions: 
No one thought Somalia was going to be cheap or completely risk free.  But Bosnia made 
it seem as though we could do Somalia with a relatively moderate force.288
 
The Pentagon did not come to support intervention in Somalia enthusiastically, but rather 
as a way to preempt any intervention decision Clinton might make.  Additionally, 
President Bush had begun to take a personal interest in Somalia, which was something he 
had not done with the Yugoslav conflict.  The President’s consideration of intervening in 
Somalia made it easier for Powell to decide to support a new intervention in Somalia.289  
Bush’s interest was drawn in part from his “[embarrassment at] the fact that the new 
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world order, which was identified with U.S. leadership, was now characterized by the 
mass starvation of Somali children.”290  In addition, the decision to intervene was made 
after Clinton’s election, which left Bush only with his legacy to consider in the final 
months of his presidency.  With no political restraints on his actions after the election, 
Bush could begin shoring up his legacy with a final, humanitarian act.291
 On November 21, with all these considerations taken into account, Powell 
instructed a deputy to announce at an interagency meeting on Somalia that the Pentagon 
was prepared to send up to two full divisions to Somalia.292  The announcement was 
unexpected; military intervention was not even on the agenda for the meeting because the 
Pentagon had opposed it so steadfastly in the past.293  The military did put some 
conditions on the deployment, mostly in an effort to make it adhere as closely as possible 
to the Powell Doctrine.  First, it was to be restricted to Mogadishu and the southern, 
hardest-hit areas of Somalia.  Second, the mission was confined to providing security for 
the delivery of aid – Powell was adamant that there be no nation building.  Third, the 
troops were to be withdrawn as soon as the situation had stabilized enough for regular 
UN peacekeeping troops to take over.294  Fourth, the operation was to be UN mandated, 
but the forces would be under United States’ command and control.295  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, Powell’s support was conditional on U.S. forces not being 
deployed to Bosnia.296  With the military volunteering two divisions to serve in Somalia, 
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Bush quickly approved the intervention, and on December 3 the UN approved the new 
U.S.-led force, dubbed the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).297  
 UNITAF’s mandate was to secure Mogadishu and southern Somalia for the 
delivery of humanitarian aid, and to prepare for UNOSOM II to take over after a brief – 
though unspecified – period.298  The general idea was for UNITAF to force the 
submission of the militias, and then allow the lightly armed troops of UNOSOM II to 
take over.  President Bush continually stressed the limited duration of the operation: 
Once we have created that secure environment [in Somalia], we will withdraw our troops, 
handing the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping force … This operation 
is not open-ended.  We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary.299
 
Though the United States had made the commitment to intervene, it proved to be a 
tenuous and highly conditional intervention.  President Bush wished to address only the 
humanitarian tragedy, and not the political underpinnings that had led to the crisis.300  
The UN Security Council agreed that the “ultimate responsibility” for rebuilding the 
country lay with the Somalis themselves, though there were ample signs that they would 
not be able to do so.301
 UNITAF was explicitly not a peacekeeping force.  John Bolton, then the Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organizations, later wrote that UNITAF 
intended to stabilize the military situation only to the extent needed to avert mass 
starvation, and the United States expected to hand the matter back to the United Nations 
in three or four months.302
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So the intervention made no pretensions of being a solution to the larger problem, but 
rather addressed only the immediate consequences of the political chaos and insecurity in 
Somalia.  In that sense, this intervention is not comparable to what Clinton eventually 
undertook in Yugoslavia.  UNITAF’s mission was not to solve the problem, as Endgame 
envisioned for Yugoslavia, but to mitigate the effects that would have a political impact 
in the United States.  The Somali civil war itself was still not important enough for 
intervention; only the humanitarian aspect drew the United States’ attention. 
 As the mission unfolded on the ground, it became impossible to adhere to Bush’s 
security-only guidelines.  The American troops slowly and inevitably became involved in 
some peacekeeping duties, which they had initially tried to avoid.303  They found it was 
impossible to be an armed force in the middle of a civil war trying to deliver 
humanitarian aid and not become in any way involved in the conflict.  In particular, the 
UNITAF troops found themselves disarming some militia members, though Bush had 
specifically refused to expand the operation’s mandate to cover disarmament.304   
 In the wake of the Cold War, Boutros-Ghali saw an opportunity to expand the 
UN’s role from traditional peacekeeping into peace enforcement, and saw Somalia as an 
early test of his ideas.305  He wanted to take maximum advantage of the well-equipped 
UNITAF force, and use it to create a situation that would allow the follow-on UNOSOM 
II force to begin rebuilding the basic institutions of the country.  Specifically, he pushed 
both Bush and Clinton to expand UNITAF’s mandate to include disarming the militias, 
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by force if necessary.306  One way this debate was framed was each side’s definition of 
‘secure.’  Boutros-Ghali believed a ‘secure environment’ was one where the militias were 
disarmed, while the Bush administration defined it only as a situation where the militias 
would let aid through unhindered.307  The debate over disarmament was just the first 
indication of the trouble that would follow when UNOSOM II took over. 
 
The Clinton Administration: An “Unprecedented Enterprise” 
 
  UNITAF’s mission ended on May 4, 1993, with the handover to UNOSOM II.  
By June, there were only four thousand U.S. troops in Somalia, down from a high of 
about 28,000.308  They were replaced by a smaller and less-capable force, which did not 
have anywhere near the combat capability UNITAF had wielded.  Additionally, the 
United States’ resistance to disarming the militias had left them largely intact; the 
military and political situation in Somalia had in fact changed little since the first 
American troops landed in early December.  Had UNOSOM II been tasked only with 
maintaining the status quo – delivering aid as UNITAF had done – its forces might have 
proved sufficient.   
However, Boutros-Ghali had a more ambitious program in mind.  With the 
encouragement of the Security Council, and by extension the Clinton administration, 
Boutros-Ghali wanted to recreate a Somali state.309  Madeline Albright, then the United 
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States’ ambassador to the UN, laid out the new and extremely ambitious agenda of the 
UN in Somalia: 
We will embark on the unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the 
restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning, and viable member of the 
community of nations.310
 
Since the arrival of UNITAF, the warlords controlling Somalia’s militias mostly 
stayed out of the UN’s way.  This was partly out of respect for UNITAF’s firepower – its 
two American divisions could easily overpower the militias – but also because they were 
not threatened by UNITAF.  Delivering aid to the civilian population did not affect the 
militias’ status in Somalia.  However, the UN’s shift to nation building did affect the 
warlords’ interests.311  The creation of a state would inevitably threaten their positions as 
rulers of their own personal fiefdoms, which they had established when the central 
government collapsed.  Some in the Clinton administration recognized the disparity 
between the UN’s resources and goals, such as the ever-cautious Warren Christopher.  He 
told Boutros-Ghali that there must be a political solution to the problem; that the UN 
peacekeeping force alone did not have the ability to rebuild the Somali state.312
 On June 5, 1993, General Aidid’s militia attacked several groups of Pakistani 
peacekeepers, and killed more than twenty of them.313  In response, Admiral Howe, the 
American civilian in charge of the UN mission in Somalia, announced a reward for 
Aidid’s capture.  Howe’s action changed the situation in Somalia irreversibly.  No longer 
was the UN a neutral actor; it had taken sides, and was fair game for the militias.314  It 
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was Howe’s bounty, which led to the infamous mission to capture Aidid on October 3, 
and resulted in eighteen dead and seventy-four wounded U.S. soldiers.315
 It was never much of a question in Washington whether or not to withdraw after 
the October 3 raid.  Clinton did not want to focus on foreign policy, and public opinion 
had grown hostile to the mission, largely due to the increasing ambiguity of the United 
States’ purpose in Somalia.  The United States had in a few months gone from delivering 
aid to starving Somalis to fighting them on the streets of Mogadishu.  The public was not 
comfortable with this role shift, especially since it was never explicitly explained.  
Clinton was never a president to go against public opinion, especially in foreign policy 
matters, about which he was comparatively inexperienced and were low on his list of 
priorities.  The President had not involved himself in the mission in Somalia, and neither 
had his senior advisors.316  In part, this disconnect is what allowed the situation to 
deteriorate as it had; without guidance from senior policymakers, Howe and the UN were 
able to decide policy in Somalia, which the Clinton administration then had no stake in, 
and did not support when the operation went bad. 
 Instead of showing a serious commitment to nation building, and reinforcing the 
remaining 400 Army Rangers in Mogadishu, Clinton made the decision to pull out 
entirely.  However, it would not do for the United States to run away immediately; first 
the troops in Somalia were reinforced with 1,700 additional soldiers and 100 armored 
vehicles, as well as several thousand Marines stationed offshore.317  These forces were 
intended to insure that the United States had enough firepower to be able to defend itself 
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if its forces ended up in another major firefight.  This reinforcement was only temporary; 
all American forces were withdrawn by March 31, 1994, leaving only the lightly armed 
UN peacekeepers in Somalia.318  Predictably, they could not institute the rebuilding of the 
state without either a political settlement or the military force to defeat the militias.  The 
remaining UN forces withdrew from Somalia in the spring of 1995, leaving it in the 
hands of the warlords. 
 It seems clear that President Bush’s interventions in Somalia were meant to 
relieve domestic and international pressures, and not to solve the country’s problems.  
Neither the interventions in August nor November of 1992 were intended to resolve the 
civil war and bring a lasting peace to Somalia.  In this sense, they are not comparable to 
the United States’ intervention in Yugoslavia in 1995.  Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s 
nation building plan for UNOSOM II embodied the spirit of intervention that would put 
an end to the conflict, but the UN forces were not strong enough to carry out his plans, 
and the United States did not have, under Bush, the desire, or under Clinton, the political 
will, to see the nation building through.  In both cases, politics, whether domestic or 
international, were the primary consideration, not humanitarian concerns. 
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Rwanda was in the midst of carrying out a series of political reforms known as the 
Arusha accords to end a civil war between the Hutu government and Tutsi rebels when 
President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down while attempting to land in Kigali on 
April 6, 1993.  Hutu Power, an extremist movement that was opposed to the settlement 
between the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), was behind the assassination.319  
Immediately Hutu Power extremists in the Rwandan government took control and began 
arresting and executing opposition figures, mostly Tutsis but also moderate Hutus.  
Quickly the Hutu militia, known as interahamwe, began slaughtering all Tutsis, who 
were easily identified by their identification papers.  In the first month, it is estimated 
about 500,000 people died, most by machete or club.  This was not a sophisticated 
genocide, but as low-tech as it could be.  The Hutu Power movement relied on the mass 
mobilization of the Hutu populace, directed by radio broadcasts, to carry out the 
genocide.  The slaughter ended about three months later when the RPF defeated the Hutu 
government forces and pushed them into Zaire.  In the meantime, about 800,000 
Rwandans were slaughtered; about four times as many people as were killed in the entire 
four-year conflict in Yugoslavia.320
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 The Clinton administration was not predisposed to intervene in Rwanda.  The tiny 
state had no strategic significance, no political power, and no interest group within the 
United States to argue for intervention.  At the time, low-level officials within the 
bureaucracy expressed the only real concern about the genocide within the government.  
Memories of the recent debacle in Somalia only reinforced the administration’s 
preference not to become involved. 
 
Not Even on the List 
 
 
Rwanda was never a strategically important country.  A tiny, landlocked state in 
central Africa with no significant natural resources, Rwanda had no strategic or economic 
value to the United States.  So when the genocide began and the civil war restarted on 
April 7, the United States’ concern was for the safety of its citizens and diplomats in the 
country.  As with Yugoslavia, some junior officials did push for intervention, but they 
had even less of a chance of succeeding in Rwanda than elsewhere.  After all, if Clinton, 
who had supported a more humanitarian foreign policy during his campaign, would not 
intervene in Yugoslavia, which was much closer to American interests and minds, 
becoming involved in Rwanda would require a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. 
 Clinton himself acknowledged on May 25 that there was no national interest 
involved in Rwanda, though it was painfully obvious by that point that genocide was 
being committed.321  The United States’ response to the genocide was in general one of 
indifference.  When pressed by the Belgian foreign minister to take some sort of action, 
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Secretary of State Christopher responded that he had “other responsibilities.”322  In 
general, there was little enthusiasm for Rwanda outside the State Department.  Tony 
Lake, the President’s National Security Advisor, was consumed by the crises in Bosnia 
and Haiti, and did not spend time on Rwanda.323  Rwanda was never on the Clinton 
administration’s list of major issues, as shown by its never having been addressed by a 
full Cabinet meeting.324  No one at a high level within the administration pushed for 
intervention in Rwanda.  Tony Lake, Al Gore, and Madeline Albright, who all supported 
intervention in Bosnia, were silent.   
 In the absence of any sort of high-level support, it was left to a few junior officials 
within the Defense and State departments to push for intervention.  However, on their 
own, they had almost no chance to alter policy.  James Woods in the Defense 
Department’s Bureau of African Affairs believed the slaughter in Rwanda warranted at 
least some amount of attention, which it had not received from more senior officials.  He 
wanted Rwanda to be placed on a list of trouble spots, but was told by his superiors, 
Look, if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care.  Take it off the list.  U.S. 
national interest is not involved and we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on 
lists … Just make it go away.325
 
The Defense Department was singularly unsympathetic to humanitarian causes, which 
given the lack of national interests at stake in Rwanda, was all Woods could argue for.   
 The complete lack of interest among senior officials in the Defense Department 
was reflected in the State Department.  Prudence Bushnell, who was a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State, was told that, “these people do this from time to time” when she was 
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considering options for responding to the crisis, and urged to worry only about 
evacuating U.S. citizens.326  Joyce Leader, who had been second in charge at the United 
States’ Rwandan embassy until it was closed in April, became the State Department’s 
expert on Rwanda.  She monitored the crisis and wrote reports, but she thought the only 
way to stop the genocide was a military intervention, which was not welcomed by her 
superiors.327
 The lack of enthusiasm for intervention among senior officials came from many 
sources.  Perhaps most important were the same considerations voiced when intervention 
in Yugoslavia was proposed.  There was little or no public support, and consequently no 
political support.  The Pentagon was still opposed to using its forces for humanitarian 
crises; it believed the duty of the military was to protect American interests, not altruistic 
interventions to help others.  First was Rwanda’s lack of any sort of strategic importance 
and a measure of racism that accompanied it.  Second, the debacle in Somalia during 
October 1993 led to unwillingness on the part of the Clinton administration and the 
Pentagon to take casualties and participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions.  
Third was an early confusion of the civil war with the genocide; it was not immediately 
clear to senior policy makers that the killing of civilians was not just a side effect of the 
civil war, but was a systematic, planned campaign. 
 Even though some 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda, it never received the 
amount of attention directed at Yugoslavia, where about 200,000 were killed.  In part, the 
lack of attention is due to the Rwandan genocide’s short duration – about three months – 
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compared with the four-year Yugoslav conflict.  However, it was also partly due to the 
United States’ psychological closeness to Europe.  Europe is more important to the 
United States economically and politically, and sentimentally, because the country is 
based on European values, not African or Asian ones.328  So while 800,000 people might 
have been killed by a genocidal regime in Rwanda, the Clinton administration never gave 
serious thought to intervening; if it were to act anywhere at the time, Bosnia was much 
closer to the American consciousness than was Rwanda.   
Perhaps this attitude is best shown by a phone call General Dallaire, the Canadian 
in charge of UNAMIR, received from the Defense Department in July, after the genocide 
had been halted and the United States was planning a humanitarian relief mission.  The 
official asked how many Rwandans had died, because they were trying to figure out how 
many casualties they were prepared to accept, and figured that 85,000 dead Rwandans 
were worth one United States casualty.329  It is difficult to imagine, even if it were true, 
that the United States would ever admit that 85,000 European lives were worth only one 
dead American.  The United States’ attitude towards Rwandan casualties indicates a 
certain amount of racism inherent in its foreign policy, which under Clinton was largely a 
reflection of public opinion.  Representative Harry Johnston, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Africa, acknowledged as much during a hearing on Rwanda.330   
Not all of the United States’ unwillingness to intervene can be blamed on a certain 
amount of racism and a distinct lack of national interest.  The deaths of eighteen 
American soldiers in Somalia the previous fall made both the Pentagon and the Clinton 
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administration almost unconditionally unwilling to intervene in Rwanda.  The Pentagon 
especially was wary of being drawn into another situation like Somalia, and was 
concerned that it might have to support an intervention in Bosnia at the same time.331  
These concerns kept the Pentagon absolutely opposed to any intervention, though one 
involving American troops was never seriously proposed.  Despite the ongoing genocide, 
Somalia was the frame of reference for Rwanda, and not a genocide such as the 
Holocaust.332   
Instead of being concerned about stopping genocide, Clinton and his team were 
focused on avoiding taking risks with U.S. troops, especially in Africa.333  A repercussion 
of Somalia was a reluctance to let other states undertake peacekeeping operations in 
uncertain situations, such as Rwanda.  The United States was afraid it would be forced to 
rescue the operation if it went awry and end up with its troops at risk.334  This risk-
adverse attitude characterized the United States’ response not just to using its own troops, 
but also to the possibility of other states sending their forces to Rwanda.  The Clinton 
administration “saw Somalia lurking around every corner” during the Rwandan genocide, 
and the desire to avoid another situation like Somalia was the driving force behind the 
United States’ policy at this time.335  Alison Des Forges from Human Rights Watch 
commented on the falsity of comparing the proposed interventions in Rwanda and 
Somalia: 
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We are not proposing an intervention force between rival armed factions, but a rescue 
operation to protect civilians.336
 
The difference in missions did not affect how decision-makers looked upon intervention.  
Sending American troops into Africa on a humanitarian mission, especially one under the 
United Nations’ auspices, was not going to happen.  No humanitarian concerns could 
change their mind.  This attitude came to be called the “Somalia Syndrome,” which was 
similar to the “Vietnam Syndrome” which characterized the military’s response to 
Bosnian intervention, with the additional fear of casualties and a growing belief in 
isolationism. 337  All of this was embodied explicitly in policy with the release of 
Presidential Decision Directive 25, which was made public in May 1994, but had been 
used as a basis for policy since the Somalia crisis in October.338   
 PDD-25 was partly a response to Congressional criticism of the United Nation’s 
peacekeeping operations and Clinton’s support for them.  Congress withheld hundreds of 
millions of dollars from the UN in the early 1990s to protest what it saw as excessive 
spending and expansion.  Clinton, in an effort to show Congress he could also be tough 
with the UN, and perhaps convince them to release some of the embargoed UN dues, 
urged the Security Council to withdraw UNAMIR unless the Arusha accords were 
quickly implemented.339  PDD-25 stipulated that peacekeeping missions should not be 
maintained in situations where there was no clear mission or exit strategy.  PDD-25’s 
“purpose [was] to use peacekeeping more selectively and more effectively than [had] 
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been done in the past,” and Rwanda, even before the genocide and restarted civil war, 
seemed a good place to cut back on UN operations.340   
 Senator Dole, who was a passionate advocate of intervention in Yugoslavia, 
summed up Congressional, and especially Republican, interest in Rwanda:  
I don’t think we have any national interest there.  The Americans are out, and as far as 
I’m concerned, in Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it.341
 
In a Congress already critical of the United Nation’s role in peacekeeping operations and 
the amount of money the United States was required to pay in support of those 
operations, calls for a heavily armed force to be sent on a dangerous mission to Rwanda 
were received coldly.  Even Dole, who expressed a great deal of concern over 
Yugoslavia, was dismissive of any attempt to intervene to save hundreds of thousands 
more lives in Africa.   
There was little Congressional pressure to act, in part because not many citizens 
were aware of what was happening in Rwanda.  There were, especially after the 
European and American citizens had been evacuated, very few reporters in Rwanda to 
cover the genocide, and so they generated little pressure on the President and Congress to 
act.342  Neither Congress nor the President paid a political price for not intervening in 
Rwanda, as they had eventually done in Bosnia.  What little Congressional effort there 
was to persuade Clinton to intervene went almost unheard.  Senators Paul Simon and 
James Jeffords from the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs wrote a letter to Clinton 
after speaking with Dallaire on May 13.  They stated the need for intervention to stop the 
 
340 Klinghoffer, 96. 
341 Power, 352. 
342 Ibid, 375. 
108 
                                                
genocide, noting that there were risks, “but we cannot continue to sit idly by while this 
tragedy continues to unfold.”343  Their letter failed to move the Clinton administration, 
which responded almost a month later with a list of actions the administration had taken 
to help Rwandans, none of which had resulted in an intervention in the month since the 
letter was sent.  With a Congress hostile to the UN in general, and further interventions in 
Africa in particular, and a public which had not shown any interest in the plight of the 
Rwandans, Clinton had no political forces pushing him to act, and actually had quite a 
number trying to restrain action. 
 The crisis in Rwanda consisted of two separate but very much related conflicts.  
The first was the genocide carried out by the Hutu regime against the Tutsi population; 
the second was the renewed civil war between the Hutu Power regime and the RPF 
rebels.  The Clinton administration chose to focus on stopping the civil war and returning 
to the Arusha accords peace process.  Most important to this decision was the lack of 
immediate recognition that there was a genocide; the death of civilians always 
accompanies a civil war, and because many of the killings in the first few days were of 
prominent Tutsis and moderate Hutus, it was easy to see the killings as a natural 
occurrence of the civil war.344  In its diplomacy, the United States tried to be evenhanded; 
it did not distinguish between the Hutu government and Tutsi rebels, but tried to be 
impartial, because it believed the central issue of the conflict was the civil war, which 
could be resolved politically.345  The United Nations was also more concerned with the 
civil war, because “in the first four weeks of genocide, the fact that a systematic and 
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continuing slaughter was taking place in Rwanda was not once discussed at length in 
[Security] Council meetings.”346   
Both the United States and the UN were more concerned with the civil war 
because that issue is what they had dealt with in the past.  Neither set of policy-makers 
initially viewed the crisis as much more than a recurrence of the civil war, and their 
discussion of peacekeeping and diplomatic efforts revolved around that understanding.  
So instead of reinforcing the peacekeepers and giving them a mandate to stop the 
genocide, the United States encouraged the Security Council to withdraw all but a token 
force; the concern was for the political process, not Rwandan lives.  Withdrawing 
UNAMIR was supposed to be a punishment for leaving the path for a political resolution; 
instead, it was a reward for the Hutu government, which saw with the peacekeepers’ 
removal an almost unobstructed opportunity to complete the extermination of all the 
Tutsis in Rwanda.   
The United States’ failure to recognize the genocide early in the crisis was not due 
to a lack of forewarning.  Three intelligence reports in the months leading up to the crisis 
hinted at large-scale ethnic violence.  In January 1994, an intelligence analyst predicted 
as a worst-case scenario that 500,000 deaths could result from a breakdown of the Arusha 
process, while a month earlier the CIA reported that some 40 million tons of arms had 
been imported to Rwanda, which should have raised warning flags given the supposedly 
peaceful designs of the government.347  Joyce Leader, the second in charge of the Kigali 
embassy, provided even more direct evidence of the extent to which the government 
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might have known genocide was underway.  She remembers that, “By 8 a.m. the morning 
after the plane crash, we knew what was happening, that there was systematic killing of 
Tutsi.”348  James Woods, deputy assistant secretary for African affairs at the Department 
of Defense, recalled: 
 … there was plenty of evidence around if you’d wanted to use it.  It was known that this 
was planned, premeditated, carefully planned, and was being executed according to a 
plan with the full connivance of the Rwandan government.  This was known.349
 
So there was plenty of evidence early on about what was happening in Rwanda, had 
policymakers chosen to acknowledge it.  However, with the simultaneous crises in Haiti 
and Yugoslavia, there was little time and no interest in looking at the Rwandan crisis 
outside of the context of the civil war.  It was far simpler and politically more desirable 
for senior officials to view the crisis as a traditional civil war, which the United States 
had at best a minimal interest in stopping, rather than as a genocide that would have 
obligated the United States to take some action.   
 In the end, though, it mattered little whether the United States viewed the conflict 
as genocide or a civil war.  In either case, there was no support for intervention.   
It did not matter if the killing in Rwanda was due to a civil war or genocide.  The United 
States was going to respond in the same anemic way – a point callously underlined in 
May when the genocide was well known but the United States refused to acknowledge its 
existence and opposed the plan to intervene.350
 
The United States wanted to avoid becoming involved in Rwanda at almost any cost – 
hence the tendency to deal with the crisis as though it were a civil war, and the 
administration’s reluctance to back any other nation’s plan to intervene.  An important 
part of this strategy was not to acknowledge that genocide was being committed in 
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Rwanda, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.  So during most of May, State 
Department officials were forbidden to use the word ‘genocide’ in reference to Rwanda.  
Only on May 21 did Secretary Christopher allow officials to say ‘genocide,’ though never 
without qualifications such as ‘acts of genocide’ that implied the full standard had not 
been met.351  After it became politically untenable to deny that Rwanda was genocide, 
Clinton’s advisors conceded the term, but reinterpreted the Genocide Convention to 
enable action, not to require it.352  The semantic argument over Rwanda was, as was also 
the case in Yugoslavia, indicative of an administration that did not wish to become 
involved.  The rhetoric of national interests, the worries about UN peacekeeping 
operations, and the tendency to see the crisis as a civil war and not genocide were all 
consequences of the Clinton administration’s unwillingness to take political risks on 
humanitarian interventions, especially in Africa. 
 Clinton never considered sending U.S. troops to stop the genocide in Rwanda.  So 
the United States’ foreign policy moves during the crisis were generally played out in the 
United Nations Security Council, where a variety of possibilities for intervention were 
discussed.  As discussed above, the United States’ first action in the Security Council on 
April 15, after the outbreak of fighting, was to demand the withdrawal of UNAMIR to 
show displeasure with the abandonment of the Arusha process.353  In a compromise, the 
Security Council agreed to withdraw all but about 500 of the 2500 peacekeepers, despite 
their immediate role protecting 15,000 Tutsis in Kigali’s soccer stadium.354  Had the UN 
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completely withdrawn, the Hutu militia and government would have almost surely killed 
all of those under its protection.  In explaining his desire to withdraw UNAMIR, 
Christopher cited a need to protect the operation’s mandate and personnel, but not those 
civilians the peacekeepers were supposed to be protecting: 
[The decision to demand withdrawal was] based on our conviction that the Security 
Council has an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping operations are viable, that they are 
capable of fulfilling their mandates, and that the UN peacekeeping personnel are not 
placed or retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation.355
 
The Clinton administration simply did not care about the civilians under the UN’s care, 
or their fate if UNAMIR withdrew.  Only the outrage by other members of the Security 
Council resulted in a token force being left behind to protect what civilians it could. 
 Six days after the United States demanded UNAMIR withdraw, General Dallaire 
in Rwanda proposed the reinforcement of his beleaguered force by bringing in several 
thousand well-equipped troops with a mandate to stop the genocide.  He claimed that 
with 5,000 high-quality troops and an appropriate mandate he could stop the genocide in 
a matter of days.356  The Clinton administration was not receptive to the proposal, 
because the risks were unknown, as was the force’s precise mission and exit strategy.  
PDD-25 showed its influence here, even though the United States was not being asked to 
contribute troops.  Almost as bad in the eyes of the Clinton administration as committing 
troops to another African humanitarian intervention was the possibility of having to 
rescue other nations’ troops which whose mission had gone badly.  So by early May the 
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Clinton administration had decided that any intervention should take place under the 
auspices of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), and not the United Nations.357
 The United States finally acquiesced to a United Nations mandate intervention 
force, UNAMIR II, on May 17, but with severe restrictions.  Ambassador Keating from 
New Zealand commented that the United States had “essentially gutted the resolution … 
in reality the expansion is a fiction.”358  The United States agreed to provide fifty armored 
vehicles for the intervention force, which was to be made up of troops from African 
states.  However, the Pentagon delayed providing the vehicles by arguing over whether 
they were to be sold or leased, how they were to be painted, and who would provide 
transport.  The vehicles were not available in Africa until July, a month and a half after 
they were initially requested, and after the genocide and civil war ended.359   
 The one intervention proposal the United States wholeheartedly supported was 
also the most distrusted, in both Rwanda and other states that actually cared about the 
crisis.360  On June 15, the French offered to deploy about 2,500 troops in Rwanda to 
protect civilians.361  The French had a history of involvement in Rwanda extending back 
to 1959 when Belgium had given the country independence.  France supported the Hutu 
regime throughout the civil war in the early 1990s and was known to be clandestinely 
supplying arms to the government throughout both the peace process and the genocide.362  
However, all that mattered little to the United States.  France offered to pay for its 
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mission itself, requested no logistical support, and nothing politically except a Security 
Council resolution authorizing its mission.  From Clinton’s perspective, it offered the 
chance to look as if it were doing something about Rwanda, without the drawbacks of 
actually having to spend money or take risks with its soldiers.  Questions of the mission’s 
effectiveness in saving the Tutsi were secondary, if present at all; it was considered a no-
lose situation for the United States. 
 The French intervention did save a few Tutsis, but it also sheltered the by then 
almost-defeated Hutu Power regime until it could escape into Zaire.  The United Nations 
had still not deployed any additional peacekeepers when the RPF gained control of most 
of Rwanda and installed a new government on July 19.363  The great question of the 
Rwandan genocide is: Could it have been stopped earlier with acceptable costs by the 
international community?  Dallaire’s repeated requests for modest numbers of troops and 
a stronger mandate, with which he judged he could stop the killing, suggest so.364   
Several observers have lent credence to that assessment, including Secretary General 
Boutros-Ghali.365  The low-tech nature of the genocide is an indication of the potential 
effectiveness of a well-equipped intervention force; the interahamwe militia who did 
most of the killing was armed mostly with machetes and only a smattering of rifles and 
grenades.  In addition, those 15,000 civilians the UN kept under its protection throughout 
the genocide by and large survived.366  The Hutu militia and government were in general 
unwilling to carry out massacres in front of UN troops.  The presence of more UN troops 
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in Rwanda with a mandate to protect civilians could have saved a great number of lives, 
even had their mission not been to defeat the Hutu Power movement. 
The United States eventually sent a few hundred troops to Rwanda in August 
1993, “for the immediate and sole purpose of humanitarian relief, not for 
peacekeeping.”367  In the end, the United States was absolutely unwilling to put any of its 
troops at risk – even in the most indirect way, as by supporting a UN intervention they 
might eventually have to go in and rescue.  To Clinton and his team, Rwanda was just not 
an issue, as it held no strategic importance, and no significant lobby ever formed within 
the United States to push for intervention.  If the crises in Yugoslavia had not warranted 
the risk of American lives in the past two years, it was almost inconceivable that the 
United States might have intervened in Rwanda.  Especially given the short timeframe of 
the crisis – approximately three months from the time Habyarimana’s plane was shot 
down until the RPF installed a Tutsi government in Kigali – there was not sufficient time 
for an administration as hesitant and unsure of itself as Clinton’s to adopt a firm and 
positive course of action. 
 





 The United States did not have a clear standard for, or even a foreign policy that 
cared much about, intervening in humanitarian crises during the 1990s.  Although 
rhetorically the Bush administration did acknowledge that genocide would be grounds for 
intervention, it resisted adopting the position that the conflict in Bosnia met the standard 
of genocide.  The Clinton administration never even went that far; although its State 
Department spokespersons strenuously resisted labeling Serb actions in Bosnia genocide, 
they also never acknowledged that doing so would automatically lead to an intervention.  
If the Bush and Clinton administrations could not agree upon even genocide as a standard 
for intervention, certainly no other act – such as the more innocuous-sounding ethnic 
cleansing – could be the standard.   
 Given that the severity of the crisis was not a factor in the United States’ decision 
to intervene, that decision was made with political considerations in mind.  These 
considerations did vary among the administrations.  The Bush administration, being 
focused on foreign policy, naturally considered the international situation – particularly 
what was good for Gorbachev in the Soviet Union – when making decisions about 
intervention for humanitarian reasons.  After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
questions of the effectiveness of a military intervention, and particularly the American 
casualties that might result, became paramount.  In both cases, Bosnia lost. 
Thus, while the conflict in Bosnia was much closer to traditional United States 
interests than the famine in Somalia, the Bush administration tried its best to ignore the 
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conflict in Bosnia, while it sent a sizable military force to lawless and hopelessly divided 
Somalia in the Horn of Africa.  Quite simply, the breakup of Yugoslavia along ethnic 
lines threatened Gorbachev’s attempt to hold together the ethnically diverse and fractious 
Soviet Republics, while no such considerations existed by the time the crisis in Somalia 
developed.  Similarly, Bosnia conjured up images of Vietnam, both among policymakers 
and in the military, while Somalia was favorably compared to the recently completed – 
and highly successful – Persian Gulf War. 
Therefore, there are two negative explanations for Bush’s decision to intervene in 
Somalia: it did not pose a problem to Gorbachev’s efforts to hold the Soviet Union 
together, and the administration viewed its terrain as more favorable to American military 
forces than Bosnia.  Although Somalia did not have the two major disadvantages of 
Bosnia, the absence of these conditions is not enough to explain the administration’s 
intervention.  Positive explanations, though, are difficult to come by.  There was only 
marginal Congressional pressure, and no influential officials within the administration or 
the bureaucracy were pushing for intervention.  The only positive explanation that seems 
to explain the intervention in Somalia is the 1992 election. 
Though some of the decision to intervene was based on the seriousness of the 
humanitarian crisis, that was by no means the deciding factor in either Bosnia or Somalia.  
The severity of the crises was never a part of the discussion on whether or not to 
intervene.  The Somali crisis had peaked during the summer of 1992, when President 
Bush and the Pentagon were still insisting that there would be no intervention.  Bosnia 
was at its worst politically for the Bush administration in August of 1992, when the 
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existence of the Serb-run camps was first publicized.  At neither peak did the Bush 
administration seriously consider intervention.   
Not until the political pressures of the 1992 election began to take a toll on the 
Bush administration was any intervention discussed.  Bush ordered his initial – and very 
limited – Somali intervention on the eve of the Republican National Convention, largely 
to defray criticism that his administration was callous to suffering there and in Bosnia.  
This intervention is explained best by the criticisms leveled at Bush by Clinton, and the 
need to show a softer side of the administration’s policies in light of Bush’s faltering re-
election effort.  President Bush’s post-election decision to deploy thousands of troops to 
Somalia is a bit more puzzling.  With the election over, it seemed that only Bush’s legacy 
was still at stake.  While his legacy was certainly a consideration, it appears that a desire 
to keep Clinton out of Bosnia was a greater influence.   
Clinton’s outraged speeches on the Bush administration’s refusal to take on the 
Serbs in Bosnia created the pressure for President Bush to do something – a grand 
humanitarian gesture to show it cared – but it was not obvious where the Bush 
administration would act.  Once Clinton created the pressure, the negative explanations – 
what Somalia was not in relation to Bosnia – decided where the intervention would take 
place.  Seen in this light, the administration and Pentagon’s preference to intervene in 
Somalia makes more sense than it initially does.  President Bush was not out to fix the 
humanitarian crisis; the mandate of UNITAF is ample evidence of that.  Instead, the best 
that can be said about Bush’s decision to intervene is that he wanted to provide short-
term relief while exposing American troops to a minimum of danger.  More likely is the 
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conclusion best supported by the evidence: Bush intervened in Somalia because of 
domestic electoral pressure, and then expanded the intervention after he lost the election 
in order to keep Clinton out of Bosnia. 
The importance of domestic politics in Bush’s decision reveals just how little his 
administration did care about the humanitarian aspects of the crises in Somalia and 
Bosnia.  The Bush administration’s worldview was still grounded in the Cold War; 
interventions would only occur if the situation presented a challenge to the national 
interest, and the Bush administration did not believe they did.  There was no 
humanitarian foreign policy under President Bush, only a last-minute appeal to appease 
its critics before the election, and then an attempt to circumscribe Clinton’s freedom of 
action after the election.  Despite the inadequacy of Bush’s response, and the opportunity 
he missed to set a precedent for the post-Cold War era, at least his administration was 
upfront about its intentions or lack thereof.  The same cannot be said of the Clinton 
administration. 
 Although Clinton chided Bush several times during the 1992 campaign for not 
giving enough weight to humanitarian crises in his foreign policy, Clinton’s dedication to 
those same crises turned out to be surprisingly weak.  Consistently, Clinton chose not to 
act when doing so would have detracted from his domestic agenda, or when there was no 
political pressure or perceived gain from intervention.  It seems Clinton’s promises while 
on the campaign trail were just that: additions to the hundreds of other pledges 
presidential candidates make in order to boost their popularity.  As is often the case with 
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such promises, they quickly fall by the wayside after the election, especially if they prove 
more difficult to implement than they originally seemed. 
 While it is uncertain whether Clinton’s commitment to ending the fighting in 
Bosnia ever went beyond political considerations, it certainly did not run very deep.  
Clinton’s quickly discarded “lift and strike” policy shows how easily he was dissuaded 
from his promise to take a more active role in Bosnia than Bush had.  The 
administration’s main consideration was how much effort would have to be spent on a 
major initiative in Bosnia.  If international politics ruled the Bush administration’s 
decision-making process, Clinton’s was almost entirely oriented towards domestic 
politics.   
 Clinton’s domestic proposals – particularly his healthcare initiative – were his 
true passions.  Foreign policy in general was subordinated to domestic policy, but this 
was particularly apparent in areas where, as in Bosnia, a policy was called off because of 
the problems it posed to the administration’s domestic policies.  The Clinton 
administration had only so much political influence and time it could spend, and within 
these finite limits, Clinton’s domestic proposals would always win out over non-critical 
foreign policy problems.  Therefore, Clinton initially pursued the “lift and strike” policy 
as a relatively low-effort way to help the Bosnian Muslims.  When it became apparent 
that implementing the policy would require a significant effort on the administration’s 
part because of considerable European opposition and a perceived insolvability of the 
crisis, Clinton backed away.  Bosnia was not important enough to warrant the effort that 
would be required to bring peace. 
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 A similar situation was at work in the Clinton administration’s handling of 
Somalia.  Partly because Bush handed the Somalia intervention to the new 
administration, and Clinton consequently was not personally invested in the intervention, 
high-level officials in the administration paid little attention to the situation.  
Consequently, the administration’s decision to abandon Somalia as soon as politically 
possible was easy to make.  No consideration was given to the Somalis, or the fact that 
the United States was leaving Somalia much as it had when it arrived – divided and 
controlled by warlords, with the United Nations troops ineffective without the 
Americans’ firepower.  Clinton’s immediate response to the Battle of Mogadishu in 
October 1993 showed how little importance humanitarian concerns were given within the 
administration when put up against domestic politics and public opinion.  With public 
opinion solidly against the United States remaining in Somalia – as well as questions 
about how the operation had gone from a humanitarian aid mission to a manhunt for a 
warlord – Clinton wasted no time in declaring the U.S. would leave.   
 Although in part a response to domestic pressures after the Somalia debacle, the 
United States’ unwillingness to intervene in Rwanda also demonstrated the 
administration’s lack of humanitarian concern in formulating its foreign policy.  Despite 
clear evidence of genocide within weeks of the conflict’s outbreak, the Clinton 
administration showed no interest whatsoever in either intervening or supporting those 
who wished to intervene.  There were few larger international issues at stake in Rwanda – 
the country was by most measures politically insignificant; in fact, an internationally 
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imposed solution may have avoided the bloodshed in the neighboring Democratic 
Republic of Congo that followed the defeated Hutu’s flight there after the genocide.   
 Without any domestic pressure groups pushing for intervention in Rwanda, 
Clinton had nothing to gain politically.  If an intervention in Rwanda were to go awry, 
Clinton would be charged with creating another Somalia – placing American troops in 
harm’s way for a cause that did not involve U.S. interests.  So with little to gain and a lot 
to lose – such as the 1996 election – Clinton knew Rwanda could not pay off politically; 
and his dedication to humanitarian ideals did not outweigh his political calculations.  The 
genocide in Rwanda had so little impact on Clinton as a humanitarian tragedy that his 
administration opposed even supporting other nations who were willing to intervene, 
based on a fear the United States might eventually have to rescue those troops.  More 
damning, and more indicative of the Clinton administration’s true priority of a 
humanitarian foreign policy than being unwilling to commit its own troops, was its lack 
of enthusiasm, or even support, for those countries who were willing to stop the fighting.  
The remote possibility that the United States might be pulled into Rwanda prevented it 
from taking measures that could easily have saved some of the 800,000 Rwandans who 
died. 
 Ironically, a similar situation in part finally led the United States to intervene and 
stop the war in Bosnia.  Whereas in Rwanda the distant possibility that American troops 
might become involved kept the Clinton administration away, the very real possibility 
that the United States might have had to deploy troops in Bosnia helped Clinton decide to 
intervene there.  Concern for the suffering of the Bosnian Muslims was no more a part of 
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Clinton’s decision to intervene in Bosnia than it had been when Bush decided to 
intervene in Somalia.  Both decisions were purely political, though Bush was more 
successful in making the intervention in Somalia appear to be based on humanitarian 
concerns.  For Clinton, several political factors had to coalesce before further inaction in 
Bosnia became more risky than intervention.  The most important was the 1996 
presidential election, which Clinton’s advisors warned might be difficult if the Yugoslav 
wars were not stopped before then.  Clinton’s Bosnia policy revealed several weaknesses 
about his presidency that would be difficult to paper over if he did not halt the conflict.  
In addition to his political weaknesses, NATO’s OpPlan 40-104 threatened to involve the 
United States in the evacuation of UN troops from Bosnia, a situation which would be 
very difficult to explain domestically, and had the potential to destroy NATO.  With the 
election on the horizon, and NATO the cornerstone of the United States’ involvement in 
Europe, neither option was acceptable. 
 The political calculation Clinton applied to his Bosnia policy did not change 
enough until the summer of 1995 to make intervention a necessity.  In an administration 
as focused on domestic politics – and its own survival – as Clinton was, intervention in 
Bosnia was never a serious option until the situation threatened those two all-important 
concerns.  If intervention in Bosnia, which was a much higher-profile crisis than either 
Somalia or Rwanda, had to wait for so many international, domestic and personal 
repercussions to make themselves felt, in retrospect it is not surprising that the Clinton 
administration chose to ignore Rwanda and leave Somalia.  The Clinton administration 
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was nothing if not sensitive to public opinion, and they surely knew that Bosnia was 
much closer to the hearts and minds of the public than was either African state. 
 Clinton’s response – and lack thereof – to the crises in Africa is not then racism 
on the part of the administration but a reflection of the attitudes of the public.  In general, 
the public’s attitudes may be considered racist, though this does not mean the 
administration’s policy was racist by extension.  Such an overriding concern within the 
administration for how the public perceived its policies suggests Clinton might have been 
willing to consider intervention in Rwanda, or staying in Somalia, had the public showed 
strong support for such a move. 
Even imagining circumstances similar to those that finally prompted intervention 
in Bosnia occurring in the cases of Rwanda and Somalia is difficult, given the lack of 
importance the public assigns to events in Africa.  A major shift in public attitudes would 
have to take place, towards an attitude that does not filter the United States’ moral 
responsibility through a geographic perspective.  In the context of the public’s general 
attitudes towards these three crises, such a shift would mean that public opinion reflected 
only the severity of the crisis, not whether it was in a remote African country or in 
Europe.  Such a shift in perceptions, however, is unlikely to occur, and certainly did not 
happen during Clinton’s tenure in office. 
The United States’ foreign policy during the 1990s did not reflect a concern for 
humanitarian crises.  Both the Bush and Clinton administrations had their own priorities 
and outlooks, neither of which involved a commitment to stopping ethnic cleansing or 
genocide.  These two administrations missed the best opportunity the United States ever 
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had to change both the primary aim of American foreign policy and the world’s response 
to genocide and other crimes against humanity.  President Bush’s “New World Order” 
quickly failed its first tests in the United States’ refusal to intervene in Bosnia and in 
Somalia during the summer of 1992.  In considering Bush’s intervention in Somalia, it is 
important to remember that the mission’s objective was explicitly not to force a long-
term, political solution, but rather to provide immediate humanitarian relief only.  
President Clinton, however, did not do any better, in either Somalia or elsewhere.  
Clinton, being the first post-Cold War, post-Soviet Union president, took office without a 
set of absolute constraints within which his foreign policy options were limited.  That 
Clinton could have remade American foreign policy, but rather chose to adopt almost the 
same positions and excuses that Bush had used before him, made his presidency even 
more frustrating.   
A large part of the problem with American foreign policy towards humanitarian 
crises is its insistence on adhering to the Cold War principle of neutral peacekeeping.  
Too often, the UN deploys peacekeepers in situations where there is little peace to keep.  
These missions – such as UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia, UNAMIR in Rwanda, and 
the UNOSOM missions in Somalia – at best will maintain the status quo, though the real 
need in these situations is to resolve the conflict.  The UN must separate Peacekeeping 
missions from Peacemaking missions.  This was impossible during the Cold War, as 
Peacemaking generally requires taking sides in a conflict, which would only have 
exasperated the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.  With the end 
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of the Cold War, and the advent of unquestioned American political, economic and 
military dominance, there is now an opportunity to establish a Peacemaking regime.   
If such a change is to occur, it must be at the behest of the United States.  
However, the political realities of the United States – specifically the lack of interest in 
putting American troops and prestige at risk for a cause that is not within the traditional 
national interest, as well as a general suspicion, especially among conservatives, of the 
UN – makes such a major change difficult to contemplate.  Much of this resistance comes 
from previous American experiences in interventions, such as Somalia and Vietnam, 
where the United States either faired poorly or was perceived to have done so.  
Overcoming the stigma of these interventions is necessary to create a more activist 
foreign policy, which would require a president willing to make the case for U.S. 
participation in Peacemaking operations under the UN.   
Participation in Peacemaking operations would have to be selective and well 
defined.  U.S. commitment should be restricted to crises where civilians are either being 
directly threatened or intentionally killed.  The UN Convention on Genocide provides a 
framework for intervention that may be used in these circumstances.  Any intervention 
needs to be carefully planned and monitored.  The Powell Doctrine is a useful guide for 
planning American involvement, providing the definition of national interest is expanded 
to include genocide.  Close control over the mandate of such interventions in necessary, 
the “mission creep” that occurred in Somalia during Clinton’s tenure would be disastrous 
in maintaining public support. 
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Of course, even allowing for the implementation of the Powell Doctrine, 
intervention will always remain a risky endeavor.  The tolerance of the public to accept 
casualties in such missions is an open question.  The outrage of the American public after 
the death of 18 soldiers in Somalia was a major consideration in President Clinton’s 
decision to withdraw the remaining troops, while a similar level of outrage has not 
developed over the much higher casualty rates in Iraq.  Part of the problem of casualties 
is the lack of importance the American public assigns to civilians dying in other parts of 
the world.  The attitude that allowed 800,000 Rwandans to die without any serious 
consideration of American intervention must be changed.   
Even given these difficulties, a shift towards a foreign policy focused more on 
humanitarian issues is still a possibility.  Although combating the “War on Terror” is 
currently the focus of American foreign policy, and seems destined to remain that way 
for some time, it does not impose the same restraints on the United States that the 
confrontation with the Soviet Union did.  No longer is there a possibility that intervening 
to stop a genocide may result in a global conflict, as the Bush administration was afraid 
would happen in Yugoslavia during 1991.  However, a shift in American public opinion 
is necessary to convince the political leaders that intervention is worth the risk, effort and 
expense.  While the United States is the unchallenged superpower in the world, it has an 
unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate that the world will no longer tolerate crimes 
like genocide.  To allow this opportunity to slip by because of shortsighted political 
concerns or a simple lack of effort is inexcusable and a disservice to the ideals upon 
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